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Abstract 
The articles comprising this dissertation concern classification and 
concept formation in the social and behavioral sciences. In particular, 
the emphasis in the study is on the philosophical analysis of interdis-
ciplinary settings created by the recent intellectual developments on 
the interfaces between the social sciences, psychology, and neurosci-
ence. The need for a systematic examination of the problems of con-
ceptual coordination and integration across disciplinary boundaries is 
illustrated by focusing on phenomena whose satisfactory explanation 
requires drawing together the theoretical resources from a variety of 
disciplines. 
In philosophy, questions regarding the nature of scientific con-
cepts have often been framed in terms of theories of natural kinds. 
For this reason, analysis of the notion of natural kind as well as exam-
ination of how theories of natural kinds should be connected to recent 
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation and mechanisms form 
the core of the study. Building on contemporary discussions on these 
topics in the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of cognitive sci-
ence, and the philosophy of the social sciences, the articles develop a 
mechanistic theory of natural kinds in the social and behavioral sci-
ences, and scrutinize its applicability and usefulness as a theory of 
conceptual change in interdisciplinary settings. The study suggests 
that, although the mechanistic theory cannot account for the function-
ing of the whole range of scientific concepts, interweaving biological, 
cognitive, and social mechanisms – in the manner suggested by the 
mechanistic theory – offers a naturalistic and non-reductionist basis 
for conceptualizing epistemic coordination across disciplinary bound-
aries. 
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Preface 
My intellectual trajectory in the world of academic education has been 
a convoluted one with several U-turns and loose ends. However, with 
the benefit of hindsight, there is a certain logic to this path, starting 
from engineering studies, interrupted by a growing interest in their 
apparent antithesis, philosophy, and eventually leading to a grey area 
between the humanities and the sciences, the philosophy of the social 
and behavioral sciences. As a like-minded colleague once pointed out 
to me, my philosophical temperament still reflects this background – 
in both good and bad, my work could often be characterized as phi-
losophy suited for the engineer's mind.  
During my work on this doctoral dissertation, I received invaluable 
help and advice from a wonderful group of people. My greatest thanks 
go to my supervisor Professor Petri Ylikoski, who invited me to join 
the Helsinki Philosophy of Science Group, first as a research assistant, 
and later as his doctoral student. In addition to being a thoughtful and 
supportive supervisor, Petri’s intellectual curiosity, courage, and his 
ability to see into the heart of the issue at hand have made him an 
important academic role model for me. Of equal importance, Acade-
my Professor Uskali Mäki’s emphasis on conceptual clarity, elegance, 
and his unerring sense of the dialectic of argumentation have been a 
source of inspiration and insight during these past seven years that I 
have been associated with his research group.  
Being involved in the projects led by Uskali and Petri, I have had 
the opportunity to be surrounded by a large group of academic men-
tors and colleagues. My most sincere thanks go to everyone in the 
Helsinki Philosophy of Science Group and the Finnish Centre of Ex-
cellence for the Philosophy of Social Sciences (TINT) for inspiring 
discussions, ideas, and the excellent feedback that I have received for 
my unfinished work. More people than can be mentioned here have 
helped me by presenting valuable comments on my articles, but I 
would especially like to thank Marion Godman, Caterina Marchionni, 
and Jaakko Kuorikoski, who gave excellent comments on an earlier 
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version of the introductory essay of this thesis. Thanks also to Juho 
Pääkkönen for word-processing assistance with the essay. 
In addition to the co-authored articles included in this dissertation, 
I have had the honor to write papers together with Tomi Kokkonen 
and Anna-Mari Rusanen. Through these projects, I have learned that 
shared intellectual efforts are often far more enjoyable than solitary 
ones, and tend to result in better outcomes. Furthermore, sharing an 
office with Aki Lehtinen, Cate, and Jaakko has transformed how I 
think about the daily life of a researcher: while uninterrupted contem-
plation no doubt has a role to play in philosophical research, so do the 
new ideas stumbled upon during lunchtime discussions, and the spon-
taneous exchange of thoughts over space dividers in the office. My 
special thanks for intellectual companionship and advice go to Jaakko. 
Working on shared projects with him has taught me important lessons 
in analytical clarity, and in how academic papers are written. Without 
Jaakko's brilliant ideas and our brainstorming sessions, my dissertation 
project would have been a lot longer and a much less happy one. 
In addition to the members of our group, I wish to thank Otto 
Lappi at the cognitive science unit at the University of Helsinki, and 
Professor Riitta Hari and the aivoAalto group at Aalto University for 
offering me a view to the cutting-edge research conducted in the mind 
sciences. Also the research visits to both the University of Edinburgh 
and the Berlin School of Mind and Brain widened my philosophical 
outlook, and during these visits, my hosts Professor Andy Clark and 
Professor Michael Pauen both kindly offered assistance and com-
ments on my unfinished ideas. I thank Professor Lisa Bortolotti and 
Professor Gualtiero Piccinini for the pre-examination of this disserta-
tion, and Lisa Muszynski for careful language revision of most of the 
articles comprising its content (it goes without saying that the remain-
ing errors are my own responsibility). I would also like to thank Pro-
fessor Matti Sintonen for offering good advice and much needed en-
couragement in the early stages of my academic career, and Docent 
Panu Raatikainen who has included me in the research team of several 
planned projects. Pekka Mäkelä has done a wonderful job in keeping 
our research community functional, and Karolina Kokko-Uusitalo and 
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Ilpo Halonen at the office have always offered their assistance when 
needed. Financially my doctoral research was made possible by a grant 
from the Finnish Cultural Foundation and a four-year research fund-
ing granted by the Finnish Doctoral Programme in Philosophy. 
In addition to my academic colleagues, I am also deeply grateful to 
my other friends and my family. Our musical pursuits together with 
Artturi Taira, Sampsa Väätäinen, and Jussi Hietala have always been 
fun, but also a lesson in the confidence and perseverance it takes to 
make something – be it a song or a scientific publication – so that it is 
not just ‘nearly there,’ but exactly like you think it should be. Of 
course, my thanks go also to my parents Pentti and Seija for uncondi-
tionally supporting me in what I have decided to do in life. Finally, the 
importance of sharing these past years with Johanna and our two 
daughters goes beyond both my words and my grasp. The time spent 
in the fun, buzzing world of Inari and Unna has served as a perfect 
counterpoint to the abstract pleasures and pains of academic work. 
Finding my way in this whirlwind of a life would not have been possi-
ble without Johanna, her dauntless spirit, encouragement, and com-
passion. 
 
Berlin, 1 July 2013 
Samuli Pöyhönen 
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Part I: Introductory essay 
1. Introduction. Phenomena on interdisciplinary 
boundaries 
The six papers comprising this dissertation concern classification and 
concept formation in the social and behavioral sciences, i.e. in disci-
plines whose principal aim is to study human behavior and its causes.1 
In particular, I aim to shed light on a scientifically important but phil-
osophically rather underdeveloped topic: conceptual change in inter-
disciplinary settings. I approach this topic by employing philosophical 
theories of concepts, natural kinds, and scientific explanation to de-
velop a mechanistic theory of natural kinds in the social and behavioral 
sciences. 
To get started, consider the multiple disciplinary perspectives in-
volved in the practices surrounding a psychiatric phenomenon, Asper-
ger's syndrome. On the one hand, diagnostic criteria of the disorder as 
well as important treatments of autism spectrum disorders (e.g., psy-
chosocial interventions) rely on common-sense psychological descrip-
tions of the phenomenon (Roth & Barson 2010, ch. 2, 6). On the 
other hand, theoretically the most unified approach to autism spec-
trum disorders is to describe them as deficiencies in the cognitive and 
attentional capacities constituting the theory of mind (Baron-Cohen 
2000; Premack & Woodruff 1978). Moreover, in addition to scientific 
psychology, also neuroscientific, genetic, and computational ap-
proaches have recently provided interesting insights into the explana-
tion of psychiatric disorders like Asperger’s (Arguello & Gogos 2012; 
Brock 2012; Montague et al. 2012). 
                                                      
1 Among the social and behavioral sciences, I include the social sciences, the 
different branches of psychology including biological psychology, and 
linguistics as well as cognitive science (Smelser & Baltes 2001). The 
boundaries of this group of disciplines are not sharp, and for the purposes of 
this dissertation, I also include psychiatry and large parts of medicine within 
this disciplinary constellation. 
Samuli Pöyhönen 
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Like many other phenomena studied in the social and behavioral 
sciences, Asperger's is not only a target of scientific research but also a 
societally important and value-laden classification. For this reason, 
research findings on the disorder have provoked reactions in those 
classified, and the changing behavior has thus made the phenomenon 
somewhat unstable (Eyal 2010). The concept has also, in a sense, 
leaked into the surrounding population and created practices of lay-
diagnosis characterizing also shy and perhaps socially awkward people 
in terms of autism spectrum disorders. Consequently, regardless of the 
correctness of these diagnoses, the classification and the scientific 
knowledge pertaining to the phenomenon have, in an interesting 
sense, participated in constructing social reality (Hacking 2002, ch. 6). 
What the existence of the multiple conceptualizations of Asper-
ger's syndrome suggests is that it, in a way, resides on an intellectual 
boundary between various different scientific fields, and it also exem-
plifies the conceptual traffic between science, everyday thinking, and 
policy. This multi-perspectival nature is characteristic also of many of 
the other examples examined in this dissertation. The research on 
human psychological abilities such as concepts, memory, or vision, 
and the study of culturally embedded psychiatric phenomena, like 
eating disorders, all raise different challenges to scientific theorizing, 
but what draws these examples together is the need for interfield integra-
tion: comprehensive understanding of these phenomena requires 
bringing together theoretical contributions from a variety of discipli-
nary perspectives. 
Different fields often study roughly the same target phenomena at 
various levels of abstraction by using different theoretical and material 
tools, and as a result, end up with apparently very different conceptu-
alizations of the same target phenomena. Hence, a central problem 
that must be answered in order to achieve conceptual coordination 
across disciplinary boundaries is how to connect the different ways of concep-
tualizing the phenomenon. In 20th-century philosophy, questions of inter-
disciplinary organization were often framed in terms of two compet-
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ing alternatives. On the one hand, reductive models of the unity of 
science (Nagel 1961; Oppenheim & Putnam 1958) suggest that high-
er-level concepts and theories can ultimately be derived from lower-
level ones. On the other hand, those advocating the autonomy of the 
special sciences have alluded to theoretical, ontological, or methodo-
logical discontinuities between disciplines as reasons for insulating 
research in higher-level disciplines from lower-ones, thus safeguarding 
them from reduction (Fodor 1974; Dupré 1995; Cartwright 1999; 
Geertz 1973; Taylor 1971). 
In the light of recent developments in the social and behavioral 
sciences, both these alternatives seem inadequate. On the one hand, 
epistemic collaboration across disciplinary boundaries is a fact of the 
matter in science. For example, results regarding the psychology of 
decision-making and social cognition have increasingly been used to 
provide a more realistic psychological basis for theories in the social 
sciences (Elster 2007; Evans & Frankish 2009; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & 
Pachur 2011; Kahneman 2011; Sperber 1996). Also recent advance-
ments in neuroscience and genetics have shown that these natural-
science disciplines are exciting sources of evidence for the psychologi-
cal sciences, and in experimental psychology, it has become common-
place to support findings by referring to evidence achieved by neuro-
science methods. In the face of these developments, claims of strong 
disciplinary autonomy or theoretical disconnectedness of disciplines 
from each other appear implausible. 
However, unlike the reductionist unity view, these interdisciplinary 
encounters do not usually suggest the reduction of higher-level theo-
ries and concepts to lower-level ones. Even the contemporary defend-
ers of reductionist models agree that genuine reductions in science are 
rare (Craver 2007, 233). Instead, multi-disciplinary research programs 
in the sciences often conceive of different fields as complementary 
sources of evidence for theorizing (Cacioppo & Decety 2011; Glim-
cher & Rustichini 2004). Moreover, conceptual influence between 
levels is not always directed from lower-level theories to the higher-
Samuli Pöyhönen 
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level ones. Often understanding micro-level structures in the mind 
sciences requires making clear the larger-context in which they func-
tion (Bechtel 2009). For example, social and psychological sciences 
can influence lower-level ones by suggesting new explananda, and by 
making traditional explananda more precise by describing the social 
and ecological environmental challenges that our psychological capaci-
ties might be evolved to meet (Duchaine, Cosmides, & Tooby 2001; 
Dunbar 1998; Laland & Brown 2002; Sterelny 2003). 
These interdisciplinary developments both within the social and 
behavioral sciences and across the boundaries of this group of disci-
plines reflect the fact that evidential and explanatory relationships do 
not respect disciplinary boundaries, and the differences in the ways 
that scientific disciplines conceptualize target phenomena do not 
make causal interrelations go away. Therefore, the challenge faced by 
philosophical accounts of interdisciplinary organization is to show 
how it would be possible to move beyond mere disciplinary pluralism 
towards a view that can satisfactorily account also for interfield coor-
dination and integration. 
 
The papers comprising this dissertation address the problems of con-
cept formation and conceptual change in interdisciplinary settings by 
building on recent discussions on natural kinds and scientific explana-
tion in the philosophy of science. I suggest that although phenomena 
studied in the social and behavioral sciences often transgress discipli-
nary boundaries in the sense that there is no one correct disciplinary 
perspective for their satisfactory description and explanation, these 
phenomena can still often be conceived of as natural kinds – or at 
least as scientific kinds. In particular, I propose that a mechanistic 
theory of kinds building on Richard Boyd's homeostatic property 
cluster theory offers a workable platform for conceptualizing phe-
nomena on interdisciplinary interfaces. My three general contributions 
to the existing literature can be summarized as follows:  
Chasing phenomena 
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(1) The articles examine how the mechanistic theory of kinds, orig-
inating in the philosophy of biology, could be applied in the social and 
behavioral sciences, where phenomena often involve intentional ac-
tion, social processes, and complex causal interactions between per-
sonal and subpersonal factors. I argue that elaborating the mechanistic 
theory, by connecting it to recent accounts of scientific explanation 
and mechanisms, results in a naturalistic but non-reductionist picture 
of concepts and phenomena that can meet this challenge. My ap-
proach suggests that strict divisions of phenomena into “social” and 
“natural” are often artificial and a hindrance to interdisciplinary 
knowledge production, and I argue that the mechanistic theory of 
kinds can shed light on classificatory controversies surrounding topics 
such as social construction and extended cognition.   
(2) As a dialectical counterpart to the first contribution, my analysis 
also points to the limitations of the mechanistic approach. First, I 
argue that in the causally complex domains studied by the social and 
behavioral sciences, the mechanistic theory of natural kinds often does 
not provide unanimous taxonomies of fields of phenomena. Instead, 
it recommends classificatory pluralism, where the choice of the units 
of analysis in a scientific discipline is determined both by the causal 
structure of the world and by the epistemic aims of the discipline. 
Consequently, it is possible for causally-based classifications in differ-
ent scientific fields both to reside at widely different levels of abstrac-
tion and to cross-classify. 
Furthermore, as a more fundamental challenge to the mechanistic 
approach, the articles also hint towards insufficiency of what could be 
called the natural kinds model of scientific concepts. Paying attention to 
concept use in scientific research practices suggests that not all con-
cepts can be aligned with causal structures, but instead several indis-
pensable scientific concepts are more general terms that function as 
devices for interdisciplinary coordination. Hence, it is reasonable to be 
suspicious of the idea of all scientific concepts functioning in the same 
way.  
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(3) The third main contribution goes some way towards resolving 
the tension between the two previous results. I suggest a slight rein-
terpretation of the common view of natural kinds in the sciences. 
Instead of approaching natural kinds as the fundamental metaphysical 
building blocks of reality, I view kind terms used in science as epistemic 
tools that the community of cognitively finite agents employs in study-
ing causally complex phenomena. Furthermore, I propose that such 
epistemic tools come in different varieties, and the semantic dissimi-
larities between different types of scientific concepts reflect their dif-
ferent epistemic roles in research. Finally, building on these results 
obtained in the articles, in the last section of this introductory essay, I 
outline a mechanism-based picture of conceptual integration in inter-
field settings, in which accumulation of knowledge across disciplinary 
boundaries is achieved by uncovering inferential constraints that parallel 
theories in neighboring fields impose on each other. 
 
The structure of this introductory essay is as follows. In section 2, I 
provide a tentative roadmap of theories of concepts and natural kinds 
that can be used to contextualize the (perhaps slightly unorthodox) 
notion of scientific concept employed in the articles. This stage-setting 
is done in two steps. First, I argue that theories of concepts in psy-
chology and philosophy should often be seen as two different theoret-
ical projects. Second, by reviewing ways of theorizing about natural 
kinds, I show that there is an important and somewhat self-sustained 
strand of the philosophical discussions on natural kinds that has been 
primarily motivated by concerns of the epistemic reliability of scien-
tific concepts. The aim of the resulting roadmap of theories of con-
cepts and natural kinds is to suggest that the account of scientific 
conceptual change developed in articles is not directly constrained by 
many philosophical discussions on these notions outside the philoso-
phy of science (e.g., in metaphysics or the philosophy of mind).  
Building on this groundwork, in section 3 I show how Richard 
Boyd's theory of natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters pro-
Chasing phenomena 
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vides a promising starting point for developing a view of the nature 
and the functioning of scientific concepts in the social and behavioral 
sciences. In section 4, I introduce the theoretical resources from re-
cent discussions on scientific explanation and mechanisms that are 
utilized in the articles. I argue that the contrastive-counterfactual theo-
ry of explanation (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2001) together with re-
cent discussions on mechanistic research heuristics (Bechtel & Rich-
ardson 2010) offer crucial conceptual tools for turning the mechanis-
tic theory of kinds into a more comprehensive picture of concept 
formation in interdisciplinary settings.  
After presenting the theoretical background in sections 2 to 4, sec-
tion 5 provides an overview of the articles, and I conclude the intro-
ductory essay by sketching a general outlook on conceptual change in 
the social and behavioral sciences suggested by the results obtained in 
the articles. 
Finally, before setting off, a word on the method employed in the 
studies. Most of the articles in this dissertation discuss case studies 
drawn from various social and behavioral sciences: multi-disciplinary 
cases from the cognitive sciences play a central role, as well as ones 
from economics, sociology, and psychiatry. The case-based approach 
reflects my naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science – the 
conviction that the philosophy of science is best done in close contact 
with actual research in the sciences. Although this requires dividing 
one's time between philosophical literature and that of the target sci-
ences, it also opens up new interesting philosophical questions, and 
hopefully sometimes produces results useful also for the scientists.  
  Despite the engagement with empirical research, the articles are 
philosophical in nature, and the main method employed is conceptual 
analysis, understood in a very broad sense. In other words, the papers 
do not introduce new empirical results, but instead my aim is to un-
derstand how scientific concepts are used in various contexts, and 
how these usages are related to each other (Griffiths & Stotz 2008; 
Hacking 2002, 24–25). Moreover, my perspective on conceptual 
Samuli Pöyhönen 
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change is not that of a historian or sociologist of science, but instead I 
use the cases for trying to illustrate general properties of the concep-
tual dynamics in scientific research.  
In analyzing scientific materials, I understand the role of a philos-
opher as that of an inferential scorekeeper: by making it clear how 
concepts are used in different research contexts, a philosopher can 
sometimes act as mediator, whose goal is to try to see the bigger pic-
ture by understanding how things generally hang together (Sellars 
1963). When it comes to questions of interfield cooperation, such 
contributions appear particularly useful, because, based on my own 
impression, not all scientists have a well-calibrated picture of the rele-
vance of their work outside their own discipline, nor do they often 
have a systematic view of how to think of epistemic coordination or 
collaboration across disciplinary boundaries. Furthermore, a clear 
picture of the relevance of scientific knowledge across disciplinary 
boundaries would be important also when scientific results are applied 
in solving practical societal problems.  
2. Scientific concepts 
Study of scientific concepts and conceptual change forms the core of 
this dissertation, and therefore I should begin with some terminologi-
cal remarks concerning my use of these notions. In the philosophical 
and psychological literature, ‘concept’ is typically taken to refer to a 
mental, linguistic, or perhaps even abstract entity that represents a 
‘kind’ or ‘category’, something in reality corresponding to it (cf. Mur-
phy 2004, 5). Although disagreements reign over the nature of both 
sides of this representational relation, the distinction between the 
representation and its target is clear enough, and I follow the en-
trenched usage of these notions.  
Respectively, by 'conceptual change,' I refer to theoretical devel-
opments in the sciences, as they are reflected in the use and contents 
of scientific concepts. I understand conceptual change in a broad 
sense that captures both concept formation and conceptual revision in 
Chasing phenomena 
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the sciences, and by using the phrase, I mainly intend to convey that 
my study of epistemic change proceeds at the level of concepts rather 
than, for example, on the level of theories, models, or paradigms. 
Unlike it is often assumed in conceptual change research in fields such 
as science education or developmental psychology, I do not presup-
pose a strong analogy between conceptual change in individual learn-
ing and scientific theorizing. Moreover, my use of the phrase should 
not be taken to imply that conceptual change should always involve 
discontinuities or radical reorganization of conceptual schemes (Kuhn 
1996; Vosniadou 2008). By contrast, I suggest that the study of con-
ceptual change in science should involve keeping careful track of the 
often subtle changes in the inferential potential of scientific concepts 
(cf. Griffiths & Stotz 2008). 
2.1. Focusing on concepts 
Although examining the level of concepts and conceptual change is by 
no means the only possible approach to studying theoretical dynamics 
in the social and behavioral sciences, I hold that there are several rea-
sons why it is an interesting perspective on the epistemic dynamics of 
interdisciplinary research.  
First, in philosophy, psychology, and in the methodological discus-
sions in the sciences, concepts are regarded as playing a fundamental 
role in inductive inference. Psychologically, concepts function as the 
mental glue that connects our prior knowledge of kinds of things in 
the world to new targets that we encounter. They enable us to see 
repetition, sameness, and continuity in the diverse world, and there-
fore help us fit the infinite reality to our limited cognitive capacities 
(Smith & Medin 1981, 8). Likewise, in philosophy, discussions on 
inductive inference have often been framed in terms of classes, kinds, 
or categories and their properties that enter into inductive generaliza-
tions (Aristotle, Topics; Goodman [1955]1983; Mill [1891]2002). The 
methodological discussions in the sciences on operationalization and 
construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl 1955; Shadish, Cook, & Camp-
Samuli Pöyhönen 
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bell 2002, ch. 3) also reflect the central inferential role of concepts. 
Regimenting the correct use of theoretical concepts is essential for 
ensuring reliable knowledge production in research.  
From all these perspectives, concepts license inferences by impos-
ing structure on perception or content. This fact makes the question 
of how to formulate our concepts an important normative issue: gen-
eralizations we make for prediction, explanation, and manipulation of 
phenomena rely on our conceptualizations of such phenomena. 
In addition to this role in grounding inductive inference, both phi-
losophers and sociologists have pointed out the coordinative role that 
central scientific concepts have in research. Multi-faceted notions such 
as GENE, ENERGY, and RATIONALITY feature simultaneously in mul-
tiple theories and have functioned as nodes around which successful 
research has been conducted (Bermudez 2004, ch. 1; Putnam 1975a; 
Star & Griesemer 1989). 
In philosophy, the tradition of natural kinds since John Stuart Mill 
(2002) has focused on these scientifically central concepts, and the 
literature on kinds suggests an explanation for the focal role of scien-
tific concepts and classifications. Their epistemological centrality ap-
pears to follow from the fact that the choice of the units of analysis 
within a field of research often reflects scientists' judgments of where 
the genuine phenomena are. It is a widely shared ideal that our classificato-
ry concepts should divide the domain of study in a way that reflects 
the objective structure of reality, and thus makes reliable epistemic 
practices possible.2 
                                                      
2 By focusing on classificatory concepts, I do not mean to imply that all 
scientific concepts are primarily classificatory (think of DEMOCRACY, 
CULTURE, or MASS) (cf. Millikan 2000, §1.1). However, in this study I 
examine concepts whose main role in thought and theory is to pick out 
individual targets in the world, and to lump them together with others to gain 
epistemic benefits. Moreover, I use the notion of classification in a broad 
sense, and I do not require that scientific classifications must be exclusive, 
exhaustive, hierarchical, or non-cross-cutting (cf. Hacking 1993). To the 
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Finally, the debates on where the genuine phenomena are also 
have important pragmatic and policy implications. Medical, psychiat-
ric, and social scientific classification-systems such as ICD and DSM 
play an important role in policy-making and are often targets of in-
tense debates. Whether Asperger's syndrome, eating disorders, addic-
tions, or post-traumatic stress disorder are regarded as genuine illness-
es has crucial implications for practical issues such as treatment inter-
ventions and insurance coverage. Therefore, having a philosophical 
theory of the nature of such concepts and classifications would be 
highly desirable. 
Thanks to the central role of concepts both in psychology and phi-
losophy, the literature on the topic in both disciplines is extensive. I 
will not engage in the daunting task of trying to review these discus-
sions.3 However, in the rest of this section I provide a tentative 
roadmap to theories of concepts and natural kinds, which can be used 
to contextualize the notion of scientific concept employed in the fol-
lowing articles. My approach to scientific concepts is based on two 
distinctions. First, I suggest that psychological and philosophical theo-
ries of concepts often arise from distinct theoretical concerns, and the 
psychological and semantic perspectives on concepts should be clearly 
distinguished from each other.4 Secondly, I argue that in the philoso-
phy of science, the question concerning the nature of scientific con-
cepts is the primary motivation for theories of natural kinds. I hold 
that the discussions on natural kinds in other philosophical fields such 
as metaphysics and the philosophy of language are often tangential to 
                                                                                                                
contrary, as is suggested in sections 5.5. and 6.2., classificatory systems in the 
social and behavioral sciences rarely satisfy such stringent criteria. 
3 For good book-length treatments of concepts in philosophy and 
psychology, see e.g. Murphy 2004; Margolis & Laurence 1999. 
4 A similar suggestion has been put forward by Edouard Machery (2009, ch. 
2). In what follows, I partly rely on Machery's insightful treatment of the 
topic. 
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the concerns of the epistemology-oriented tradition of natural kinds in the 
philosophy of science. 
2.2. Concepts in psychology and philosophy 
In psychology and the cognitive sciences, conceptual thought is con-
ceived of as a psychological capacity that (at least) we humans have. 
Concepts are understood as mental representations that go beyond 
mere sensory content, and are capable of representing absent and 
sometimes abstract targets. The central theoretical aim of psychologi-
cal concept theories has been to explain how these cognitive feats are 
realized by the functioning of cognitive and neural mechanisms. More 
precisely, the goal of psychological theories of concepts has usually 
been to determine what kind of knowledge features in processes un-
derlying the higher cognitive capacities, how this knowledge is used in 
these processes, how it is acquired, and where it is located in the brain. 
By doing so, the theories hope to explain various properties of cogni-
tive competences such as categorization, inductive inference, memory, 
learning, problem-solving, analogical inference, and language. 
Such explanatory projects typically conceive of concepts as infor-
mation structures stored in long-term memory (Machery 2009, 12). 
Psychologists are by no means unanimous about the nature of these 
structures, and disagree whether concepts are property clusters, exem-
plars, theory-embedded structures, or perhaps ad-hoc compositions 
created on the fly, as has been suggested by concept empiricists 
(Barsalou 1999; Prinz 2002). Despite these deep-seated disagreements, 
psychological theories typically share an ontological view of concepts 
as real psychological structures that can be referred to in causal expla-
nations of individual behavior. 
 
Among the wide array of modern philosophical theories of concepts, 
there appear to be only two fundamental properties that the theories 
mostly agree on: concepts are a way to refer to targets in the world, and 
they carry content regarding the properties of those targets. Theories of 
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conceptuality fail to agree on much else. Firstly, theories of neurose-
mantics, mental representation, linguistic concepts, and scientific con-
cepts all approach content at different levels of inquiry (Eliasmith 2005; 
Dretske 1981; Fodor 1998; Piccinini & Scott 2006; Churchland 1984, 
56). Secondly, atomistic theories and those advocating inferential role 
semantics strongly disagree on how much inferential content and 
connections to other concepts should be included in the meaning of 
concepts (Fodor 1998; Block 1998; Brandom 1994). Thirdly, a sizable 
industry in the 20th century philosophy of mind and language focused 
on the disagreement as to whether the reference of concepts is fixed 
by causal contact with their correspondents in reality, or by the cogni-
tive content of concepts (Frege [1892]2010; Kripke 1980; Putnam 
1975b). 
Despite these major differences, it is possible to distinguish com-
mon characteristics of the philosophical theories of concepts that set 
them apart from the psychological ones. In stark contrast to the ap-
proach in psychology, for the last hundred years, the philosophical 
tradition has been strongly anti-psychologist, and has often empha-
sized the sharedness and abstract nature of concepts. From the para-
digmatic philosophical viewpoint, concepts are not understood as 
psychological structures but rather as constituents of propositional contents 
(Laurence & Margolis 1999, 6), and conceptual identity is not deter-
mined by referring to causally real information structures in the head, 
but instead by operations on conceptual content. For instance, in 
Fregean spirit, Christopher Peacocke (1992, 2) suggests that two con-
cepts are distinct if substituting one for the other in an otherwise iden-
tical proposition could create cognitive novelty.  
I take it that these properties reflect the fact that philosophical dis-
cussions of concepts primarily concern their semantic properties. 
Typically, the philosophical theories aim to specify the conditions that 
have to hold in order for a concept to refer to a particular group of 
things in the world. For example, descriptivism, causal theories of 
reference, and teleosemantic theories all offer different accounts of 
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the nature of the relationship between a representation and the set of 
things in the world that it correctly applies to. As noted by Jussi Jylkkä 
(2008, 10), theories of concepts are often assumed to "determine not only 
which objects we reckon as belonging in categories, but also which objects truly 
belong in them." Importantly, this question is quite alien to the psycho-
logical theories, and therefore inability to provide an account of the 
possibility of misrepresentation, or answer issues raised by ignorance 
and error (Putnam 1975b), should not count as arguments against the 
adequacy of psychological theories.  
In sum, one could say that whereas psychological theories are ul-
timately in the business of explaining the functioning of cognitive struc-
tures, semantic theories in philosophy aim to explicate the conditions 
that would need to hold for someone to possess a certain sub-
propositional thought content. 
 
Of course, the differences between these viewpoints do not mean that 
there would be no interesting relationships between the psychological 
and philosophical theories. In classical and early modern theories of 
concepts, no clear distinction was often made between the two view-
points (Locke [1690]1975; Mill 2002). Also after Frege, the coevolu-
tion of philosophical and psychological theories has continued. The 
development of psychological theories starting from the classical view 
of concepts (Hull 1920) to prototype theory (Rosch 1978; Rosch & 
Mervis 1975;) and theory-based approaches (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; 
Murphy & Medin 1985) were strongly influenced by parallel philo-
sophical developments (Carnap 1932; Putnam 1975b; Wittgenstein 
1953). Recently, there has also been conceptual traffic in the opposite 
direction: often the contemporary philosophical theories of concepts 
and natural kinds summarize findings on concept structure in psy-
chology, and compatibility with psychological theories is sometimes 
used as an argument in favor of a particular philosophical theory 
(Griffiths 1998, 176–192; Kornblith 1993, ch. 4). 
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In the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology, the 
relationship between these two points of view has often been seen as 
particularly intimate, and the theories of concepts in these fields some-
times fall between what I described as the psychological and semantic 
viewpoints. A well-known example of the approach closely linking 
them is Jerry Fodor's theory of concepts (1998; 2010). According to 
Fodor, concepts serve a dual role as real entities in the language of 
thought and also as constituents of propositional contents; language 
of thought is the causally real platform for propositional thoughts, 
thus acting as a bridge between the two perspectives. Importantly, a 
similar presupposition sometimes underlies empirical research in the 
cognitive sciences. For example, Susan Carey's psychological theory of 
conceptual change attempts to remain sensitive to philosophers' re-
quirements for a theory of concepts (Carey 2009, ch. 13).  
These hybrid theories reflect the methodological conviction in 
both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology that a 
theory of concepts should be able to answer questions arising from 
both psychological and semantic perspectives by relying on one uni-
fied theory of the topic. For instance, in their influential reviews of 
theories of concepts, Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis pit the 
psychological and philosophical theories against each other, and assess 
each in the light of the same set of challenges allegedly faced by theo-
ries of concepts in general (Laurence & Margolis 1999; Margolis & 
Laurence 2012). 
It seems that ultimately the rationale for the hybrid theories is a 
general commitment to naturalism: creating a close connection be-
tween the structure of our cognitive machinery and propositionality is 
often thought of as a precondition for a naturalistic account of propo-
sitional thought and its properties (i.e. systematicity, productivity). 
However, given the important differences between the psychological 
and semantic concept theories, I do not believe that such a straight-
forward way of making this connection is helpful. Psychological and 
semantic theories address largely different questions, and draw on very 
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different kinds of evidence. Therefore, I find problematic the assump-
tion that a single theory of concepts would be adequate for both these 
theoretical projects (Rusanen & Pöyhönen 2013). Based on my per-
sonal experience of grappling with the often confusing literature on 
concepts, I have come to believe that for the sake of clarity, it is useful 
to assume that the notion of concept works in somewhat different 
ways in the psychological and philosophical literatures. Hence, for the 
purposes of the current study, I suggest treating psychological and 
philosophical theories as two distinct perspectives on concepts.  
That said, I do think that examining the relationships between the 
psychological and semantic theories in detail would be an interesting 
task, and that the kind of naturalistic theory of scientific concepts 
developed in this dissertation should pay attention to considerations 
arising from both these perspectives. However, such a project should 
not start by simply collapsing the distinction between them. Instead, 
having a clear view of the theoretical motivation of each cluster of 
theories helps to make clear the kind of input that these theories could 
offer to the kind of theory of scientific concepts developed here. 
In the following sections on natural kinds, and in the articles them-
selves, I will have more to say about the semantic properties of scien-
tific concepts. However, discussions of psychological concept theories 
or hybrid theories do not play a major role in this dissertation. This is 
because I do not think that existing psychological research on con-
cepts or the theories in the philosophy of mind could offer very sub-
stantial constraints to my account of scientific conceptual change. 
Firstly, the research on concepts in experimental psychology has often 
focused on concepts that are as divorced from outside knowledge as 
possible. It is not entirely clear how the study of non-theoretical con-
cepts employed by isolated human individuals in psychological labora-
tory experiment settings should influence our view of the cognitive 
structures employed in complicated scientific inference.  
Secondly, a reason that further limits the usefulness of the existing 
psychological concept theories for my account of conceptual change 
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has to do with the social aspects of scientific research. Scientific in-
quiry is a collective process carried out by a community of scientists, 
and the correctness of scientific inference is often guaranteed by 
communal practices of communication and error correction. Hence, 
for the study of scientific concepts it seems that investigating the so-
cial processes behind concept transmission in scientific communities 
would be as important an empirical task as the research done in indi-
vidualist psychology (Bishop 2002; Downes 1999; Faucher et al. 
2002).5 
For similar reasons, I suspect that many classic accounts in the phi-
losophy of mind of how mental symbols succeed in referring to their 
targets (Dretske 1981; Fodor 1998) might be largely peripheral for the 
questions studied in this dissertation. Due to the theoretical nature of 
scientific concepts and the division of linguistic labor within the scien-
tific community (Putnam 1975b) teleosemantic and information-
theoretic accounts do not appear as adequate semantic theories for 
scientific concepts.  
2.3. Concepts and reality. Theories of natural kinds  
The distinction between the psychological and semantic perspectives 
on conceptuality is the first step in navigating among the variety of 
theories of concepts. Moreover, I suggested above that theories of 
concepts both in psychology and in the philosophy of mind often fail 
to capture important aspects of scientific concepts. In this section, I 
                                                      
5 The social nature of scientific theorizing could actually be seen as an even 
more serious argument against making a theory of scientific concepts 
conform to a model of concepts originating in psychological research. For 
example, although Kornblith (1993, ch. 4) and Griffiths (1998, 176–192) 
appeal to our tendency to psychological essentialism (Gelman 2003) as an 
argument for the theory of natural kinds that they defend, why could it not 
be so that good scientific concept formation requires intentionally countering 
certain psychological biases in our thinking (e.g., essentialism) – perhaps 
good scientific concepts are sometimes psychologically unnatural. 
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try to shed light on their nature by discussing two questions that a 
theory of conceptual change in science should be able to answer: (1) 
Where the epistemic reliability and usefulness of scientific concepts 
come from, and (2) how, if at all, they are related to structures in reali-
ty. These interrelated questions address perhaps the most central con-
cerns in the discussions on natural kinds in the philosophy of science. I 
introduce three influential approaches to answering these questions: 
essentialism, empiricism, and scientific realism.6  
The discussions on natural kinds in the philosophy of science rep-
resent only one part of the usage of the notion, and the topic has re-
cently received a lot of attention also in other parts of philosophy. In 
the philosophy of language, natural kinds have played a central role in 
arguments against descriptivism, and in metaphysics, the concept 
features in discussions concerning the laws of nature, natural necessi-
ty, and essentialism (cf. Bird & Tobin 2008). The purpose of the fol-
lowing selective history of the concept of natural kind is to suggest 
that in the philosophy of science, theories of natural kinds have largely 
been motivated by a concern different from the ones above: the infer-
ential reliability of scientific concepts. In the articles, I take this idea 
further and argue that the discussions on natural kinds in the philoso-
phy of science forming what can be called the epistemology-oriented tradi-
tion of natural kinds (Reydon 2009; cf. Brigandt 2010) are at least partly 
independent from the other uses of the notion in the philosophy of 
language and in metaphysics.7 Consequently, while my approach to 
natural kinds in the social and behavioral sciences might appear coun-
ter-intuitive to some, I suggest that many of the intuitions against my 
view stem from these other discussions, and should not be under-
                                                      
6 The following overview of the tradition of natural kinds is partly based on 
Ian Hacking’s (1991; 2006) seminal research on the topic. 
7 In addition to the separate uses of the term in philosophy, in psychology 
'natural kind' is often used to refer to classifications that are psychologically 
primary or perceptually salient (Berlin 1992; Keil 1992). In this thesis, I do 
not discuss this psychological use of the notion. 
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stood directly as grounds for arguments against my theory of classifi-
cation and conceptual change. 
 
Aristotelian essentialism  
In philosophy, perhaps the most long-lived picture of the relationship 
between scientific concepts and reality is Plato's image of “carving 
nature by its joints” (Plato, Phaedrus, 265a–266a). However, in the 
history of science, a botanical metaphor has played a more pervasive 
role. Based on an Aristotelian picture of the relationship between 
nature and scientific research, until the turn of the 19th century, 
Porphyry's tree was the analogy for scientific knowledge. According to 
the Aristotelian ideal, it was seen as the objective of science to create a 
universal hierarchy of things by correctly categorizing all things in 
nature according to their species and genus. It was thought that each 
species has a group of properties flowing necessarily from its essence, 
other properties being accidental (Ayers 1981, 248–252). Scientific 
knowledge was supposed to correspond to the hierarchical structure 
of reality, and the inferential legitimacy of scientific concepts was 
anchored in this correspondence.  
In early modern philosophy, this picture of the concurrence be-
tween the structure of reality and our conceptual system was chal-
lenged by materialist metaphysics and the new empiricist epistemolo-
gy. John Locke (1975) famously argued that the properties of various 
natural phenomena are not differentiated by species-specific Aristote-
lian forms, but instead determined by different configurations of the 
same material substance. Locke gave two separate arguments for the 
nominalist approach to classification that he propounded. According 
to the metaphysical argument, phenomena in nature differ from each 
other in various ways and hence there is no natural way to classify 
them. Nature has no single set of joints. The second argument was 
epistemological: Locke proposed that even if there were microstruc-
tural real essences in nature, they would be beyond our perceptual 
capacities. Consequently, our classifications cannot follow reality’s 
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own divisions but are only the work of our understanding (Locke 
1975, III, vi, §36–37).  
Despite the empiricist critique of Aristotelian essentialism in phi-
losophy, classification in many of the sciences still relied on the Aris-
totelian model until the turn of the 19th century. At that time, espe-
cially biological classification was in its golden age: Carl von Linne's 
system of biological nomenclature and categorization offered the the-
oretical basis for classifying unknown species of plants and animals 
arriving to Europe from the colonies (Hacking 2006). While Linne's 
method was based on empirical observation, it still relied on the hier-
archical Aristotelian picture of reality consisting of nested species and 
genera. However, the birth of the theory of natural selection with its 
emphasis on population-level thinking undermined the philosophical 
basis for the intuitively appealing Aristotelian essentialism. Within 
population thinking, there is no explanatory role for a species essence. 
Explanations of the common properties of species are provided by 
referring to factors such as common ancestry and evolutionary selec-
tion pressures (Grene & Depew 2004, 35–53; Sober 1980). 
 
Empiricism: The birth of 'natural kind' 
Dispensing with Aristotelian metaphysics made Locke's view an ap-
pealing contender for an empiricist approach to the foundations of 
classification. However, the problem with his view was that it could 
not give a satisfactory explanation to why some classifications appear 
more significant than others. Some concepts appear to pick out preex-
isting divisions in reality, whereas others are based on mere conven-
tion and linguistic agreement. Classifications of elementary particles 
seem more fundamental than classification of people according to 
their political views, and classifying animals according to their species 
more natural than grouping them according to the color of their fur. 
The birth of the notion of natural kind was motivated by this tension 
in empiricism between a nominalist approach to classification and the 
need to justify inductive inference (Boyd 1991). The notion has been 
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used to draw the distinction between classifications that merit scien-
tific inquiry and merely conventional classifications, without relying on 
the metaphysically suspect notion of essence. 
Formulating a theory of naturalness of classifications compatible 
with the nominalist spirit of empiricism was the task taken up by phi-
losophers such as William Whewell ([1847]1967) and John Stuart Mill 
(2002). As Mill’s theory is considered to be the first actual theory of 
natural kinds, and because it nicely captures the epistemic motivation 
for the use of the notion, I’ll briefly describe it here. 
According to Mill, the common names in our language can be di-
vided into two groups. There are (i) words whose referents have only 
one property in common, and (ii) those whose referents share an in-
numerable amount of properties that are logically independent of each 
other. Mill called these groups finite classes and real kinds, respectively 
(Mill 2002, I, vii, §3–8). Mill’s example of a finite class was the group 
of white things. The members of this group have nothing else in 
common than the property of whiteness and others that logically fol-
low from it (e.g., being colored, not-being-red). His examples of real 
kinds, on the contrary, are classifications that have thereafter often 
been treated as paradigmatic examples of natural kinds: classes of 
animals, plants, minerals, and chemical compounds such as sulfur and 
phosphorus. What the set of real kinds has in common is that scien-
tific research has repeatedly revealed new surprising similarities be-
tween the instances of these kinds.  
Mill offers the empiricist tradition the first picture of how scientific 
concepts are special. Without making any deep metaphysical com-
mitments to the existence of kinds in nature, Mill’s distinction tries to 
make precise the convincing intuition that some of our concepts cap-
ture true regularities in reality, whereas others may be based on lin-
guistic conventions only. Real – or natural – kinds are the ones that 
can support reliable inductive inferences and therefore deserve scien-
tific attention. 
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After Mill, the notion of natural kind drifted away from the limelight 
for almost half a century. The development of formal logic as a new 
powerful tool of conceptual analysis, and the verificationist semantics 
of logical empiricism inspired attempts to reduce the notion of natural 
kind to less problematic or empirically better-defined notions. For 
example, Carnap (1950) tried to define kinds in terms of classes – later 
to be famously criticized by Goodman (1983). Often in these discus-
sions, the notion of kind was connected to other disreputable notions 
such as disposition and similarity, and both Russell (1948, 462) and 
Quine (1969) suggested that in mature branches of science, these psy-
chologically salient but scientifically vague notions would be replaced 
by descriptions of laws or mechanisms underlying the kind disposi-
tions.  
In practice, the empiricist discussions on inductive inference often 
focused on the lawlikeness of hypotheses, and natural kinds were 
simply thought of as predicates that enter into the law-statements 
(Fodor 1974; Goodman 1983; Putnam 1975a).8 However, a shift to-
wards more substantive notions of kind was initiated when it turned 
out that determining the genuine lawlikeness of hypotheses might 
require constraining the group of predicates that can enter into such 
generalizations. Nelson Goodman's grue paradox played a central role 
in this transition (Stalker 1994). A widely accepted implication of the 
paradox is that syntactic properties of competing generalizations (in-
volving 'blue' vs. 'grue') alone are not sufficient for distinguishing 
scientifically legitimate hypothesis from problematic ones, and 
Goodman himself suggested that gruesome hypotheses could be 
avoided by setting non-syntactic criteria for the predicates that can 
feature in these generalizations (Goodman 1983, ch. IV). According to 
Goodman, genuinely lawlike hypotheses must be phrased in terms of 
                                                      
8 The tight connection between laws of nature and natural kinds is still 
endorsed by nomological theories of natural kinds (Rosenberg 2005; Hull 1980; cf. 
Murphy 2006, 336). 
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projectible predicates, where projectible predicates must refer to relevant 
or genuine kinds. While Goodman's own construal of kindhood in 
terms of the notion of entrenchment remained firmly within the em-
piricist approach to kind-systems, a popular approach to articulating 
what the relevance or naturalness of kind terms could be has been to 
suggest that natural kind concepts refer to causally real targets in reali-
ty. In the following, I call this group of theories natural kinds realism.  
 
Scientific realism and natural kinds 
The emergence of natural kinds realism in the second half of the 20th 
century was closely related to problems of empiricism, and the conse-
quent rise of scientific realism. The criticisms against a strong analytic-
synthetic distinction had questioned the semantically foundationalist 
project, in which the empiricists hoped to reduce theoretical kind-
terms back to observational or physical base vocabularies. In contrast, 
the realist commitments to the existence of theoretical entities and to 
the possibility of their accurate representation are reflected in treating 
theoretical terms as referring expressions anchored in the (often non-
observable) causal structures of reality. 
Moreover, the emergence of realist interpretations of natural kinds 
in the philosophy of science was facilitated by Kripke's and Putnam's 
work in the philosophy of language in the 1970s. Firstly, causal theo-
ries of reference suggested a picture of how our natural kind concepts 
could refer to the same targets in reality despite the sometimes perva-
sive change in our beliefs regarding them. The possibility of such ref-
erential stability has been an influential response to the theory-
ladenness and incommensurability arguments underlying the construc-
tivist anti-realist alternatives to scientific realism. Secondly, while their 
work concerned primarily the philosophy of language, Kripke and 
Putnam often drew their examples of natural kinds from science, and 
inspired a metaphysical picture of natural kinds that has been called 
simple essentialism (Murphy 2006, 335–338). Borrowing ways of speak-
ing from the Aristotelian and early empiricist views of science, simple 
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essentialism suggests that there are natural kinds like GOLD or WATER 
whose "real essences" are constituted by their microstructure. While 
the instances of such kinds are often identified by more superficial 
stereotypical properties, the (sometimes unknown) true extension of 
the kind is determined by nature alone.   
An important advantage of natural kinds realism is that, unlike 
their empiricist alternatives, realist theories offer a strategy for explain-
ing the property correlations postulated by natural kind concepts by 
referring to the causal structures underlying them. By the same token, 
these realist theories can provide a compelling justification for the 
inductive reliability of natural kind terms (Kornblith 1993, 42). For 
example, referring to the essence of water as H2O provides a solid 
microstructural basis for explaining the observable properties of water 
in various circumstances. 
In sum, since the 1970s it has become increasingly common to 
think that (1) at least some of our scientific concepts are natural kind 
terms, and that (2) they are based on the mind-independent causal 
structures in the world instead of only observed regularities. Further-
more, (3) kinds are assumed to be investigable by empirical methods 
(Boyd 1999). In the next section, I show how the mechanistic theory 
of natural kinds satisfies these sensible realist demands, but still ap-
plies to the often fleeting phenomena in the social and behavioral 
sciences.  
3. Mechanistic theory of natural kinds  
As was noted above, paradigmatic examples of natural kinds often 
come from the natural sciences: the kindhood of elementary particles 
or chemical substances is guaranteed by the shared microstructure of 
the instances of the kinds. However, consider some of the phenomena 
in the social and behavioral sciences discussed in the articles below. 
Human cognitive abilities such as memory or the capacity for concep-
tual thought are outcomes of the functioning of evolutionary process-
es, and they do not appear to be supported by universal and excep-
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tionless laws of nature. Psychiatric phenomena like Asperger's, patho-
logical gambling, or bulimia nervosa are deeply embedded in the sur-
rounding social structures, and arguably the existence of culture-
bound disorders depends on a specific social context. These kinds of 
phenomena are not only supported by the intrinsic properties of the 
members of the kind, but they also rely on the functioning of stabiliz-
ing mechanisms in the environment.  
However, these phenomena are far from being stipulations or 
"mere" social constructions. Although they do not have intrinsic es-
sences and they are not directly supported by laws of nature, they are 
stable and predictable enough to plausibly be considered as building 
blocks of our cognitive architecture and social reality. Moreover, as in 
the natural sciences, the kind concepts play a role in scientific explana-
tions of human behavior and in designing interventions on phenome-
na.  
As I mentioned in section 1, I use the phrase 'social and behavioral 
sciences' to refer to the constellation of scientific disciplines that all 
primarily aim to provide understanding of human behavior and its 
causes. In addition, my usage of the label also reflects my commitment 
to the belief that there is no deep qualitative dividing line between 
"harder" behavioral sciences, like biological psychology or cognitive 
science, and "softer" disciplines like sociology and psychiatry. Despite 
the theoretical quietism or even instrumentalist attitude of some scien-
tists, research practices in several disciplines in the social and behav-
ioral sciences suggest that classificatory decisions made in research 
reflect scientists' understanding of what the real phenomena studied in 
the discipline are. Therefore, a working hypothesis in the following 
articles has been that in the whole range of the social and behavioral 
sciences, despite the differences in their particular methods and styles 
of theorizing, the ultimate goal of research is the same: uncovering 
genuine phenomena (Bogen & Woodward 1988) and causal structures 
underlying them.  
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I hold that this methodologically monist position together with my 
epistemology-oriented interpretation of natural kindhood introduced 
in the previous section legitimatize my approach that treats research 
also in the social and behavioral sciences as being after natural kinds.9 
However, due to the reasons given above, traditional theories of natu-
ral kinds building on the notions of law and essence do not seem ade-
quate for describing phenomena in the special sciences. The theory of 
classification in the social and behavioral sciences developed in the 
following articles builds on a more promising account of special sci-
ence kinds, Richard Boyd's theory of natural kinds as homeostatic property 
clusters.  
3.1. Natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters  
In a series of publications spanning several decades, Richard Boyd 
(1980; 1983; 1991; 1999; 2010) has developed his naturalistic and anti-
foundationalist version of scientific realism that tries to take into ac-
count insights both from constructionism and sophisticated forms of 
empiricism (Kuhn 1996; van Fraassen 1980), while still arguing for an 
undiluted form of scientific realism. His theory of natural kinds plays a 
central role in this endeavor. In the following, I introduce three cen-
tral features of Boyd's theory that make it a promising starting point 
for my account of classification and concept formation in the social 
and behavioral sciences. First, Boyd understands natural kind terms as 
mediators between the inferential needs of a scientific discipline and 
the often complex causal structure of the world. Second, his approach 
is naturalistic in the sense that it implies that kind membership as such 
does not ultimately do any explanatory work; the use of kinds in scien-
                                                      
9 I should emphasize that I do not think that this methodological monism 
implies anything that could be called methodical monism. Different fields 
studying human behavior employ widely different methods, and the weak 
kind of methodological monism that I advocate only implies that the ultimate 
epistemic and practical aims of research across the social and behavioral sciences 
are the same. 
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tific inference is justified by empirical knowledge of the causal struc-
tures underlying a kind. The third central feature of Boyd’s theory is 
that natural kinds need not be supported by universal and exception-
less laws of nature. Instead, they can be sustained by mechanisms that 
have limited scope and that are sensitive to changes in background 
conditions.  
It could be said that Boyd's approach to scientific concepts has its 
roots in the issues raised by the grue paradox discussed in section 2.3. 
Boyd recognizes the role of conventionalist elements in concept for-
mation, and characterizes conceptual change in science as a deeply 
theory-laden project, in which new theories and concepts are created 
based on new empirical findings, but also on existing theoretical 
knowledge (Boyd 1980; 1983). Describing concept formation as a 
dialectical process in which we iteratively devise more accurate and 
instrumentally reliable representations of targets in reality, Boyd char-
acterizes the epistemic role of natural kind concepts as one of accom-
modating between the epistemic aims of a scientific discipline and the 
causal structure of reality (Boyd 1999, 56). I take it that the slightly 
opaque metaphor of accommodation is meant to convey the idea that, 
in order to count as a natural kind term, a concept need not describe 
the target of research perfectly accurately, or in full detail. Instead, it is 
sufficient that a natural kind term captures relevant causal structures 
of the target in a way that satisfies the inferential needs of the disci-
pline in question. 
In this sense, Boyd's theory sits firmly within the epistemology-
oriented tradition of natural kinds: Boyd conceives of natural kind 
terms as being embedded in the epistemic practices of scientific in-
quiry, and his theory of natural kinds offers an explanation of where 
the inferential and practical reliability of these concepts comes from. 
 
While Boyd's overall defense of scientific realism is intricate, the cen-
tral idea of his theory of natural kinds is easy to understand. Accord-
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ing to Boyd, many scientifically interesting natural kinds are homeo-
static property clusters, and they consist of two elements: 
{HPC} 
α) a group of often co-occurring properties, and 
β)  a homeostatic causal mechanism that brings about their 
co-occurrence 
(Boyd 1999, 67). 
The idea is perhaps easiest to grasp through an example. Boyd’s para-
digmatic example of an HPC kind is a biological species.10 Despite the 
variation within the population, the members of a species share a 
number of morphological, physiological, and behavioral properties 
because of the exchange of genetic material. The homeostatic mecha-
nism supporting the cluster of shared properties is the interbreeding 
of conspecific populations combined with reproductive isolation from 
contraspecific ones – members of a species mate only with each other, 
not with individuals outside their species (ibid.). In subsequent discus-
sions in the philosophy of science, this approach to the unity of kinds 
has been applied also to phenomena in the psychological and social 
sciences (Griffiths 1998; Machery 2005; Mallon 2003; Samuels 2009). 
 
There are a few different interpretations of the notions of homeostasis 
and mechanism in this picture. On the one hand, Hilary Kornblith 
(1993, 35) understands mechanisms as the kind members' intrinsic 
properties that tend to occur together and account for the observable 
properties of the kind (Murphy 2006, 339). On the other hand, Paul 
Griffiths (1998, 188) adopts a far more liberal stance, according to 
which any theoretical structure that accounts for the projectibility of a 
category counts as its essence. Furthermore, in her account inspired 
                                                      
10 In the philosophy of biology, the question of whether biological species are 
natural kinds has been the topic of a long-standing controversy (cf. Wilson 
1999). 
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by Boyd's theory, Ruth Millikan apparently understands the reference 
to mechanisms in an etiological sense: a mechanism is the series of 
events that has brought about the co-occurrence of the properties in 
the cluster (Millikan 1999; 2000). 
The mechanistic theory of natural kinds examined in this dissertation 
differs from all of the interpretations above.11 In contrast to Griffiths, 
my version of the mechanistic theory suggests that not just any theo-
retical explanation for clustering will do, but instead, homeostatic 
mechanisms must be causal structures. However, in contrast to Korn-
blith, I do not think that all mechanisms are intrinsic to the members 
of the kind. Moreover, unlike Millikan, I understand the role of mech-
anisms in sustaining the property cluster in a synchronic manner. It is 
not the past but the current functioning of the homeostatic mecha-
nism that explains the way that the properties cluster.  
Therefore, the mechanistic theory is basically a two-level picture of 
natural kinds. Natural kinds are relevant from the point of view of 
inductive inference, because they have robust clusters of relevant 
properties that can be generalized to new instances of the kind. 
Knowledge of the homeostatic mechanism is useful for inductive 
inference in an indirect manner: knowing the mechanism can be used 
to explain the co-occurrence of the properties in the cluster, and the 
mechanistic information facilitates counterfactual inferences of how 
the cluster would change if the underlying causal structure or the 
background conditions were different. 
Assembling a theory of concept formation around the notion of 
mechanism has some interesting advantages. In relying on causal in-
                                                      
11 My version of the mechanistic theory resembles those put forward by 
Machery (2009), Murphy (2006), Kendler, Zachar, and Craver (2010), 
Samuels (2009); and Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt (2007). I gratefully 
acknowledge some intellectual debts to these accounts. However, as becomes 
evident in the articles below, especially my views on the nature of 
mechanisms and on classificatory pluralism set my approach apart from many 
of these positions. 
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formation as the foundation for classification, the mechanistic theory 
obeys the naturalistic order of explanation: Delineation and identifica-
tion of kinds, and projectibility judgments regarding their properties, 
are made a posteriori, based on empirical findings about the targets of 
research. Ultimately kind-membership as such does not have explana-
tory force, but when kind terms are employed in scientific explana-
tion, claims about projectibility of predicates are justified by 
knowledge of the homeostatic mechanism of the kind. The mechanis-
tic theory thus fulfills Quine’s (1969, 52) requirement that mature 
fields in science should base their inductive inferences on knowledge 
of the structures underlying kind-dispositions, not on unexplained 
similarities between the members of kinds.  
Replacing the notion of law with that of causal mechanism also 
makes the account a promising contender for a theory of concept 
formation in the special sciences, where exceptionless laws of nature 
cannot be found. Finally, employing the notion of mechanism in a 
theory of classification suggests a way to bridge two separate discus-
sions in the philosophy of science: Although there is no satisfactory 
analysis of the notion of mechanism in the literature on natural kinds, 
it is possible to rely on the extensive discussions on the concept in the 
philosophy of biology and the philosophy of cognitive sciences to 
elaborate this central notion of Boyd's theory (see section 4). 
3.2. Mechanistic theory and conceptual change 
A large part of the appeal of the mechanistic interpretation of Boyd's 
theory of natural kinds has stemmed from its usefulness as a founda-
tion for a theory of conceptual change in the life sciences. Based on 
the theory, it has been suggested that familiar notions such as EMO-
TION, MEMORY, or CONCEPT do not form genuine natural kinds, and 
should therefore be eliminated from the scientific vocabulary (Craver 
2004; Griffiths 1998; Machery 2009).  
The central idea of the accounts of conceptual change building on 
Boyd's theory is that we should align our concepts with mechanistic 
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structures in reality. In brief, what I call the split-lump-eliminate scheme 
(SLE) is based on three operations [see VI]. Firstly, if a concept refers 
to several different mechanisms, we should split it so that each mech-
anism gets its own corresponding concept. Secondly, however, a con-
cept should capture the maximal class of phenomena sustained by the 
same mechanism. Therefore, if it turns out that a group of phenome-
na that were previously considered as separate are supported by a 
common mechanism, we should lump these phenomena under the 
same concept. And thirdly, if no well-defined mechanism corresponds 
to a natural kind concept, the notion should be eliminated from scien-
tific vocabulary. The core idea underlying these three operations is 
that there should be a one-to-one correspondence between scientific 
concepts and mechanisms in reality (ibid.). 
The SLE scheme has been particularly popular in the philosophy 
of psychology. In comparison to its recent predecessor as a picture of 
conceptual change in this domain, eliminative materialism, the SLE 
scheme is an advancement in several respects. It offers a more fine-
grained picture of conceptual revision by not only focusing on elimi-
nation but also including cases of unification and non-eliminative 
conceptual refinement as species of conceptual change. Moreover, 
unlike many of the earlier discussions, the model does not rely on 
semantic intuitions about reference as a basis for conceptual change 
(Stich 1996). 
3.3. Theories of concepts and kinds. Sketching the roadmap 
I now briefly recapitulate the main points made in the past two sec-
tions. In section 2, I suggested that psychological and semantic theo-
ries of concepts should be thought of as two different perspectives on 
conceptuality. While a theory of scientific concepts – like the mecha-
nistic theory examined here – should be compatible with insights from 
both these perspectives, it is not entirely clear how substantial con-
straints the psychological concept theories and the discussions on 
concepts in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology 
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could impose on a theory of scientific concepts: As Boyd's theory 
suggests, scientific concepts are typically embedded in networks of 
theoretical inference and revised based on knowledge achieved by 
theory-laden methods. Consequently, it is not clear how contributions 
from either psychological research on simple perceptual concepts, or, 
for instance, information-theoretic accounts of representation in the 
philosophy of mind (Dretske 1981; Fodor 1998) should be connected 
to the current perspective.  
In addition, the theories of natural kinds comprise a motley crowd. 
Discussions on natural kinds serve several distinct conceptual aims, 
and I suggest that the literature in the philosophy of science primarily 
motivated by the inferential reliability of scientific concepts is some-
what distinct from theories of natural kinds in philosophy of language 
and metaphysics [I]. I should emphasize that, obviously, there are 
interrelations between the different ways of theorizing about kinds. 
My aim here has been merely to shift the burden of proof so that the 
shared aims and presuppositions of different theories cannot just be 
assumed, but they must be argued for.  
Although the distinctions made in the sections above inevitably 
remain tentative, I believe that they are useful, especially because 
many theories of (scientific) concepts and natural kinds in the existing 
literature do not explicitly position themselves in relation to other 
theories. This situation easily creates confusion, or at least, it often 
remains unclear which theories one should pay attention to in one's 
own theorizing about concepts. 
 
The task of the two previous sections has been largely negative in 
spirit. By suggesting that philosophical discussions on concepts and 
kinds do not form a unified debate, I have tried to free up conceptual 
space for developing my theory of scientific concepts. I next turn to 
what I believe is a more fruitful source of intellectual resources for 
elaborating a theory of conceptual change in the social and behavioral 
sciences – philosophical discussions of scientific explanation and 
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mechanistic research heuristics. Perhaps the most crucial conceptual 
maneuver performed in the articles in this dissertation is to develop 
Boyd's theory by connecting it to insights from the recent philosophi-
cal literature on the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explana-
tion. Such work is helpful, because as commentators of Boyd's theory 
have pointed out, the notion of mechanism employed in the theory is 
not altogether clear (Craver 2009; Reydon 2009). I argue that closer 
examination of the notion in Boyd's theory results in a more devel-
oped picture of how kinds and mechanisms are identified, and where 
their inferential usefulness derives from.  
4. Explanation and mechanisms 
The existence of a close relationship between classification and expla-
nation has been recognized both in the psychological and philosophi-
cal literature (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; Griffiths 1998; Lombrozo 
2009). However, often treatments of the topic have not relied on a 
systematic theory of explanation, and I believe that the fruits of apply-
ing the latest developments in the theory of explanation to questions 
concerning the foundations of classification have not yet been picked. 
In this section, I introduce the theory that I regard as the most 
promising contender for an account of causal explanation in the social 
and behavioral sciences, the contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation 
(CC-theory) (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2001). I also review parts of 
the recent philosophical literature on mechanisms. Although the 
mechanistic approach to explanation and the contrastive-
counterfactual theory have sometimes been seen as competing pic-
tures of explanation (Waskan 2011), I think that it is also possible to 
think of them as being complementary (Craver 2007; Glennan 2005; 
Steel 2008; Ylikoski 2011). In my view, the division of labor between 
the theories is roughly as follows: the mechanistic approach to expla-
nation offers a realistic view of research practices in the sciences, and 
CC-theory can be used to elaborate its conceptual foundations. Firstly, 
CC-theory offers a non-reductivist account of mechanisms suitable 
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for describing the biological, cognitive and social mechanisms occur-
ring in the social and behavioral sciences. It also, secondly, provides a 
systematic criterion for demarcating the boundaries of mechanisms 
and, thirdly, it suggests that prima facie competing mechanistic explana-
tions phrased at different levels of description might often turn out to 
be complementary. Hence, it offers useful resources for thinking 
about interfield cooperation in scientific research.  
4.1. Contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation 
A shared starting point for many theories of scientific explanation has 
been to distinguish explanation from other epistemic activities (e.g., 
description and prediction) by pointing out that explanations offer 
information of a specific kind: explanations tell why or how something 
happened. According to the still most widely-known model of scien-
tific explanation, the deductive-nomological model (DN-model), ex-
planation is essentially a matter of subsuming explanandum-events or 
higher-level laws under the laws of nature.12 The model articulates the 
notion of explanatoriness as nomic expectability; according to Hempel 
(1965) we have explained a result when we could predict it as an out-
come of the laws of nature and the relevant initial conditions. 
In the following articles, I rely on what Petri Ylikoski and Jaakko 
Kuorikoski call the contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation (Ylikoski 
2001; Kuorikoski 2010). This theory is largely similar to James 
Woodward's (2003) well-known account of causal explanation, and 
my view is also indebted to Woodward's theory. Compared to the 
DN-model, the contrastive-counterfactual theory takes a clearly dif-
ferent approach to explanation. It suggests that explanatory why- and 
how-questions are answered by tracking change-relating counterfactual de-
pendencies between the relata in the explanation. Successful explana-
tions uncover objective relations of counterfactual dependency be-
                                                      
12 For good summaries of the development of theories of explanation in the 
philosophy of science, see Salmon 1990 and Ruben 1990.  
Chasing phenomena 
35!
!
tween things in the world. Roughly, in the case of causal explanation, 
had the cause variable been intervened upon, the effect would have 
been different. 
A second fundamental principle of CC-theory is that, at least im-
plicitly, explanations have a contrastive focus (Garfinkel 1981; van 
Fraassen 1980; Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2007). They can usually be 
characterized as answers to questions of the form: why fact rather 
than [foil], where the foil is an exclusive alternative to the fact. Ex-
planatory knowledge thus has the following form: 
{EK} x [x’] because of y [y’]  (variable X takes the value x  
 instead of x’ because Y has  
  the value y instead of y’) 
This characterization of explanatory knowledge allows us to clearly 
specify the difference between explanatory and descriptive knowledge: 
Explanations allow us to answer counterfactual what-if-things-had-been-
different questions (Woodward 2003). That is, while descriptive 
knowledge provides answers to what, when, where, and how-much ques-
tions regarding the factual properties of phenomena, explanatory 
knowledge of invariant relationships tells how changes in explanantia 
(explanatory factors) would influence explananda (things to be ex-
plained) (Ylikoski 2011). 
Such an approach to explanatory knowledge breaks the problemat-
ic symmetry between prediction and explanation assumed by the DN-
model. CC-theory implies that despite there being problems with pre-
dicting the molar behavior of complex systems, tracking dependencies 
between variables offers a way to uncover and understand causal pro-
cesses underlying the systems in a piecemeal way. This distinction is 
useful because it can be used to reply to antinaturalist arguments that 
cite the impossibility of accurate prediction in the social sciences as a 
reason for rejecting explanation as their theoretical aim. 
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Moreover, by not making reference to laws of nature, CC-theory 
avoids another antinaturalist argument. The sharp division between 
natural and social sciences has been defended by arguing that phe-
nomena in the social sciences are not amenable to nomological expla-
nation, and indeed, law-based accounts are widely held to be problem-
atic pictures of explanation both in the psychological and the social 
sciences (Cummins 1983; Craver 2007, ch. 2; Hedström & Ylikoski 
2010). However, as CC-theory conceives of explanation as tracking 
dependency-relations between variables, it avoids many of the prob-
lems of the law-based accounts. Explanatory dependencies need not 
be universal or exceptionless, only a modest degree of invariance is 
needed. CC-theory also offers conceptual resources for precise as-
sessment of the scope and stability of these explanatory relationships, 
and consequently, it can be used to characterize the often local and 
exception-ridden nature of special science generalizations in a more 
analytical way than the one offered by ceteris paribus accounts of special 
science laws (Woodward 2008; Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010).  
4.2. Explaining with mechanisms 
In many parts of the life sciences, it is common to think that a genuine 
explanation of a phenomenon requires providing a description of a 
mechanism (Wright & Bechtel 2007; Ylikoski 2012). The concept of 
mechanism has recently acquired an important role also in the philos-
ophy of science literature. These discussions have mainly focused on 
the ontology of mechanisms and the search for mechanisms as re-
search heuristics in the life sciences. 
According to traditional intuitions about mechanisms, relationships 
in mechanistic structures are based on solidity, rigidity, and impene-
trability, and the explanatory usefulness of mechanism description 
derives from these properties. In a similar manner, Wesley Salmon's 
(1984; 1998) causal-process account of explanation relies on the spa-
tio-temporal continuity of mechanisms, and their ability to transmit 
conserved quantities such as energy or momentum. However, in many 
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recent discussions in the life sciences, a broader notion of mechanism 
has been employed. Since the seminal paper by Machamer, Darden, 
and Craver (2000), mechanisms have often ontologically been under-
stood as causal structures consisting of entities and their activities. In 
different disciplines, the entities and activities can be of different 
complexities, and for instance in the cognitive sciences, the activities 
can often be described in information-processing terms (Bechtel 
2008). In sum, it has become common to understand a mechanism in 
broad sense as (i) a collection of causal parts (ii) organized together to 
sustain a stable (iii) phenomenon (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; 
Glennan 2002; Woodward 2002). 
 
In their work, William Bechtel and Robert Richardson (2010) have 
studied the role of mechanistic research heuristics in the practices of 
scientific explanation. In the life sciences, a typical explanatory task is 
to understand how a complex capacity of a system is made possible by 
its material structure. Bechtel and Richardson characterize the reduc-
tivist research heuristics employed in attacking such problems as con-
sisting of three stages. First, the explanandum phenomenon is de-
composed into a set of simpler functional units. Then, the system in 
question is structurally decomposed into its components parts. Finally, 
one tries to fit these decompositions together by localizing the func-
tional capacities on the structural components of the system.  
Together, the three stages amount to a strategy for reverse-
engineering complex systems: constitutive explanation by functional 
decomposition and localization produces hierarchical multi-level de-
scriptions of systems, where a higher-level explanandum capacity (ψ-
ing) is explained in terms of the organized functioning of lower-level 
capacities (φ1, … , φn), which in turn are explained by decomposing 
them into yet lower level capacities (ρ1, … , ρm) (Figure 1). By show-
ing how the material parts of the system and their organization con-
spire to constitute the capacities mentioned in the functional decom-
position of the explanandum phenomenon, the explanation discloses 
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how the explanandum is brought about by a multi-level constitutive 
mechanism.13 
 
4.3. Contrastive-counterfactual analysis of mechanistic  
explanations  
I now suggest that CC-theory can be seen as giving a systematic ac-
count of why describing mechanisms is explanatory in the first place. 
The analysis of the nature of explanatory knowledge in section 4.1. 
suggests that describing mechanisms allows us to answer what-if-
questions regarding what would happen to the explanandum phenome-
                                                      
13 As shown by Ylikoski (2012), there are important differences between 
causal and constitutive explanation. Whereas causation is a relation between 
distinct events and it takes time, constitutive relationships hold between the 
properties of the whole and its parts, and do not manifest the manipulational 
asymmetry characteristic of causal relations. Despite the differences between 
causal and constitutive explanation, both can be understood as tracking 
dependencies between explanantia and explananda. 
Figure 1. Craver diagram (cf. Craver 2007, ch.5) 
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non, if there were changes to the components of the mechanism or 
their organization. Describing mechanisms allows us to answer how-
questions by "opening black boxes," by revealing more detailed de-
scriptions of the processes connecting causes and effects. Mechanistic 
explanation is therefore a species of reductive explanation in the weak 
sense that it aims to provide understanding of the properties of the 
whole in terms of the properties and organization of its components.  
However, CC-theory makes it explicit that constitutive mechanistic 
explanations need not amount to strong reductivism. Such explana-
tions do not explain away higher-level explananda, but only articulate 
how they depend on their parts. CC-theory suggests that mechanisms 
can be found at several levels of analysis, if it is possible to analyze 
occurrences at a level in terms of the functioning of components, 
which are modular in the sense that it is possible to change the behav-
ior of one part independently of the others, and if their behavior con-
forms to generalizations that are invariant at least under some inter-
ventions (Woodward 2012). Thus, the contrastive-counterfactual the-
ory offers a non-fundamentalist account of mechanisms suitable for describ-
ing the biological, cognitive, and social mechanisms occurring in the 
social and behavioral sciences.  
Another advantage of amalgamating CC-theory with mechanistic 
theories of explanation is that CC-theory provides a systematic criteri-
on for mechanism identification and for demarcating their boundaries. 
It is generally agreed that a good explanation has to distinguish be-
tween relevant explanatory factors and mere causal background condi-
tions, but earlier accounts of mechanistic explanation, such as 
Salmon's causal-mechanical theory, typically lack a satisfactory analysis 
of explanatory relevance (Hitchcock 1995). By contrast, CC-theory 
provides a relevance criterion for mechanism demarcation: as I have 
argued, the theory suggests that, given a cluster of explananda (corre-
sponding to the explanatory aims at hand), an explanatory mechanism 
should include those, and only those, factors that are needed to ex-
plain the contrasts between explanandum states and their contrastive 
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foils [IV]. This suggests that a mechanism could be seen as a chunk of 
the causal structure of reality, isolated for explanatory purposes. 
For similar reasons, CC-theory provides a workable starting point 
for analyzing relationships between different mechanistic explanations 
of the same target phenomenon. The contrastive nature of explanato-
ry knowledge suggests that explanations are always aspectual, and that 
explanations do not explain phenomena as such, but only answer 
certain contrastive questions about their properties. Consequently, 
often prima facie competing explanations of a phenomenon might turn 
out being compatible, once their different contrasts are properly 
spelled out. For example, laboratory and ecological approaches in the 
psychological study of human memory often pick their variables of 
interest differently, and delineate the studied systems in different ways. 
They can answer different contrastive questions about the target, and 
need not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive approaches to stud-
ying the target (see section 6.4.). 
4.4. Setting the agenda 
The general research agenda in the following articles arises from the 
theoretical background introduced in the past three sections. I hold 
that the homeostatic property cluster theory of kinds together with the 
literature on scientific explanation and mechanisms provide a promis-
ing starting point for a naturalistic theory of conceptual change in the 
social and behavioral sciences. However, several questions remain 
regarding the applicability of the mechanistic approach in the social 
and behavioral sciences. 
(1) Both Boyd's theory of kinds as well as the theories of mecha-
nisms originate in discussions in the philosophy of biology, and ex-
tending them to the social and behavioral sciences raises novel con-
ceptual problems. In order to pass as a satisfactory description of 
research practices in the social sciences, it needs to be shown that the 
mechanistic model can be employed also as an explanatory model of 
intentional and intersubjective action. In particular, as is suggested in 
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the articles below, complex criss-crossing causation between factors 
from social, personal-level, and subpersonal spheres creates consider-
able challenges to mechanistic explanation in the social and behavioral 
sciences (Hacking 1995b). 
(2) The contrastive approach to the analysis of explanatory rele-
vance based on CC-theory suggests that the way that mechanisms are 
identified and demarcated, and how they should be described, are 
relative to the explanatory aims at hand. As argued by Craver (2009), 
this seems to imply that the mechanistic theory of natural kinds fails 
to provide unambiguous judgments of where the kinds are, and differ-
ent explanatory aims can lead to different ways of classifying the same 
domain of phenomena. This seems to challenge the usefulness of the 
mechanistic theory as a normative account of scientific classification. 
(3) Several indispensable scientific concepts raise concerns about 
the scope of the mechanistic theory of kinds and the SLE scheme of 
conceptual change: many concepts (e.g., GENE, RATIONALITY, IN-
FORMATION) do not appear to correspond to a single well-defined 
mechanism, but they still play an important role in scientific research. 
Therefore, whether the mechanism-based account can provide an all-
encompassing picture of scientific concept formation is an issue that 
requires further study. 
5. Overview of the articles 
Because the papers are an outcome of several years of work revolving 
around the same set of issues and attacking the same problems from 
various angles, they are connected to each other by messy relations of 
family resemblance. Between each pair of articles, it is possible to 
identify several common threads. In consequence, deciding how to 
put them in a linear order was not easy. I have decided to organize the 
articles in roughly the order that they were written, as this ordering 
reflects the development of my thinking on the topic, and also corre-
sponds to the three open questions to the mechanistic approach in-
troduced at the end of the previous section: The six articles can be 
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divided into three pairs. The first two examine how the mechanistic 
theory of natural kinds can be applied to psychiatry and the social 
sciences. The second pair delves deeper into the conceptual machinery 
that I utilize by examining the central notion of mechanism, and dis-
cusses questions of mechanism description and identification in the 
mind sciences. The last two papers examine challenges to the mecha-
nistic theory raised by non-modular target systems and non-
mechanistic scientific concepts. 
5.1. Carving the mind by its joints: Culture-bound psychiatric  
disorders as natural kinds  
Carving the mind by its joints provides a common starting point for the 
rest of the articles by introducing the mechanistic theory of natural 
kinds and by distinguishing this notion of natural kind from other 
uses of the concept in other parts of philosophy. The paper picks up a 
problematic culture-bound psychiatric disorder, bulimia nervosa, and 
argues that such problematic phenomena sustained by both physiolog-
ical and social causal factors should be understood as natural kinds, 
instead of as social constructions.  
Argumentatively, the paper is structured around a dilemma. On the 
one hand, bulimia appears as a classic contrast case to natural kinds. 
The eating disorder is sustained by a hybrid set of causal factors. 
While research suggests that there are physiological and genetic causes 
that make certain individuals susceptible to bulimia, the illness is also 
sustained by norms regarding slimness and beauty, and is thus de-
pendent on social factors. Therefore, bulimia does not appear to 
count as a natural kind: it is not supported by a law of nature, it re-
quires a specific socio-cultural niche to exist, and in consequence, it is 
spatiotemporally local. On the other hand, calling it a "mere" social 
construction would be misleading as well. There are robust generaliza-
tions to be made about the illness, it is sustained by real – albeit partly 
social – causal structures, and the psychological and societal conse-
quences of the phenomenon are evident.  
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My solution to the dilemma proceeds by conceptual analysis of the 
notion of natural kind. I argue that the tradition of natural kinds con-
sists of several partly independent strands, and the notion of natural 
kind is used in importantly different ways in the philosophy of lan-
guage, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. The central claim 
of the article is that although in the light of discussions in, say, meta-
physics, calling culture-bound phenomena such as bulimia natural 
kinds would appear odd, for the purposes of the epistemology-
oriented tradition of natural kinds, such a strategy is coherent. Since 
Mill (2002), the central motivation in the epistemological tradition has 
been to distinguish scientifically pertinent phenomena and concepts 
from conventional or erroneous ones, and to thereby identify con-
cepts that can reliably support our epistemic practices (see section 2.3. 
above). My solution thus slips through the horns of the dilemma by 
making more precise the notion of natural kind which is relevant to 
the concerns motivating discussions on natural kinds in the philoso-
phy of science. 
The second goal of the paper is to argue that the mechanistic theo-
ry of natural kinds should be interpreted as a contribution to this epis-
temology-oriented tradition of natural kinds, and that the theory of-
fers a promising platform for approaching complex interdisciplinary 
targets such as bulimia. I show how within the mechanistic frame-
work, culture-bound phenomena can be conceived of as natural kinds 
that are sustained by hybrid mechanisms comprising of neural, psycho-
logical, and social submechanisms.  
Extending the theory of natural kinds to (partly) socially supported 
phenomena in the social and behavioral sciences has three main epis-
temic advantages. As pointed out by Hacking (1999), the social con-
structionist rhetoric is often unclear whereas, by contrast, the mecha-
nistic theory (1) offers a more analytic approach to understanding 
sociological causation. The reliance on counterfactual mechanistic 
information (2) provides conceptual tools for assessing the reactions 
to treatment interventions in different contexts. And the hybrid-
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mechanisms approach (3) provides a promising framework for con-
ceptual and explanatory integration between different fields working 
on the same phenomenon. In psychiatry, such an integrative approach 
could also have considerable practical value by downplaying the stark 
controversies between supporters of pharmacological and therapy-
oriented approaches to treatment.  
5.2. Looping kinds and social mechanisms  
Classifying people into categories has always been a strategically im-
portant task for the social sciences. Classifications make it possible to 
localize social problems into certain groups of people and makes them 
easier to control and prevent. However, it has been widely recognized 
among social scientists that the practices of classification themselves 
have important social consequences (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; 
Giddens 1984), and studies of how labeling and classification influ-
ence the behavior of the classified have played an important role in 
fields such as criminology, sociology of deviance, mental illness, polit-
ical sociology, and sociology of science. Given the increasing cultural 
visibility of neuroscience and genetics, this relationship between scien-
tific knowledge and behavior is as important as ever. Knowledge of 
one's genetic susceptibility to certain illnesses or personality traits, as 
well as the novel neuro-discourse, can be rich sources of self-
conceptualization for the modern individual (Singh & Rose 2009).  
The capacity of labels and classifications to influence identity and 
behavior appears to be based on three features of classifications of 
humans: (1) they are usually dependent on socio-cultural practices and 
often local in space and time; (2) medical and social-scientific classifi-
cations of humans are normatively loaded; and, (3) their targets are 
conscious agents. In his now classic set of case studies, Ian Hacking 
(1995a, 1998) has studied the looping effect of human kinds, which is a 
consequence of these features of classifications in the social and be-
havioral sciences. The dynamics of looping can be briefly described in 
the following way: new classifications of people often provoke reac-
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tions in those classified, and this creates a need to revise the original 
classification to fit the new property profile of the target group. The 
new knowledge might again provoke unpredicted reactions in targets, 
and this feedback-connection between behavior and scientific 
knowledge sets the looping in motion.   
The looping effect can seem like a serious obstacle to the applica-
tion of the mechanistic theory of kind-concepts in the social and be-
havioral sciences. The reflexivity typical of looping kinds has motivat-
ed claims of social construction of the phenomena in question. More 
generally, looping can be interpreted as an instance of the kind of 
sensitivity of human phenomena to meanings and intentions that sets 
the social and behavioral sciences methodologically apart from scienc-
es employing causal-mechanistic explanation. Moreover, looping 
makes human scientific phenomena volatile, and this has often been 
seen as a general challenge to the realistic understanding of concepts 
and classifications in the social and behavioral sciences.  
This article continues the line of argument begun in the first paper. 
Jaakko Kuorikoski and I argue that it is possible to incorporate loop-
ing human kinds within the mechanistic model of natural kinds. Fur-
thermore, we propose that the kind of social construction implied by 
looping is not an insurmountable challenge to a causally realist ap-
proach to classification in the social and behavioral sciences. By rely-
ing on a set of examples drawn from social psychology, economics, 
and psychiatry, we illustrate how looping effects can be described in 
terms of the functioning of a set of different kinds of social and cog-
nitive causal feedback mechanisms that mediate the effect. Furthermore, 
we argue that the fleeting cases of looping kinds described in Hack-
ing's case studies capture only a special form of a more general phe-
nomenon, there being also situations in which interactivity stabilizes 
phenomena. In fact, we suggest that mechanisms similar those behind 
the looping effect often sustain relatively stable social institutions. 
Often the seemingly spontaneous order of social reality is founded 
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upon shared and self-reinforcing expectations concerning appropriate 
behavior. 
The mechanistic picture of looping kinds offers several advantages 
compared to Hacking's original account, which portrays looping in 
"semantic" terms, as a relationship between action and meaning 
(Murphy 2006, ch. 7). Most importantly, by stressing the importance 
of having knowledge of the causal processes underlying reflexivity, it 
accounts for the fact that people's awareness and interpretations of 
classifications only become social reality when they are acted out. 
Looping is sustained by social and cognitive mechanisms, and know-
ing these mechanisms allows one to answer a large set of counterfac-
tual what-if questions that merely descriptive accounts of looping ef-
fects fail to answer.  
5.3. Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience 
There has been an extensive discussion on mechanisms in the recent 
philosophy of science (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; Glennan 2002; 
Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000). However, the literature has main-
ly focused on ontological questions concerning the nature of mecha-
nisms and their parts, and on epistemic considerations regarding the 
discovery of mechanisms and their explanatory role. The topic of this 
paper, the question of how mechanisms ought to be (linguistically) 
described has received considerably less attention.  
In their controversial work, Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker 
(2003; 2008; 2009) (B&H) have laid out a wealth of examples from 
psychological and neuroscience research showing that in the mind 
sciences it is common to describe the functioning of the brain and its 
parts with intentional predicates. The famous claim of these authors is 
that in describing neural and cognitive structures in intentional terms 
– as believing something, making inferences, or forming hypotheses, 
to mention just a few examples – neuroscientists make a conceptual 
mistake that nullifies the explanatory power of their theories. In at-
tributing cognitive capacities belonging to the whole (the human 
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agent) to its parts (the brain), neuroscientists are said to commit the 
mereological fallacy, resulting in the creation of nonsense.  
Although B&H's critique is exaggerated, and often relies on out-
dated notions of explanation, and on a rigid view of functioning of 
common sense psychological concepts, neither do I find the most 
prominent replies to their critique satisfactory (Churchland 2005; 
Dennett 2007). In stark contrast to B&H, their adversaries like Daniel 
Dennett have often adopted an attitude of wholesale acceptance to-
wards the contested language use. I show that in cognitive neurosci-
ence, there are both successful and somewhat confused uses of inten-
tional predicates in mechanistic explanations, and subsequently, it 
should be considered a criterion of adequacy for a theory of sub-
personal intentional language use that it can differentiate between 
these two types of cases.  
My solution to the problem raised by the use of intentional predi-
cates in neuroscience starts from a switch of perspective from seman-
tic to explanatory: to understand the contested language use, one must 
pay attention to its explanatory context. Following the heuristics of 
decomposition and localization approach to psychological explanation 
(see section 4.2.), I suggest that the relationship between mental phe-
nomena and their neural basis should not be understood as a mapping 
between two levels, the mental and the physical (Kim 1992), but in-
stead as a hierarchy of abstract descriptions of the same system 
(Bechtel & Richardson 2010; Craver 2007). This view suggests that 
there is no sharp dividing line between levels that are acceptably de-
scribed in representational terms and "purely" mechanistic ones (Ly-
can 1990). However, there are important ways in which the mechanis-
tic account of explanation constrains the use of common-sense psy-
chological concepts in subpersonal explanations. In brief, I suggest 
that (1) inferential commitments made in mechanism descriptions 
must be compatible with lower-level descriptions of the same material 
structures and (2) the explanatory import of functional decomposi-
tions depends on mechanistic parts being simpler than explananda. 
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Working out the consequences of these normative principles unfolds 
my account and my criticism of both B&H and Dennett's intentional-
stance approach. 
My own position could be called cautious liberalism about mecha-
nism description. I propose that inferentially rich common-sense psy-
chological concepts (guessing, inferring, etc.) can in principle be used 
to describe subpersonal levels, if such concepts adequately capture 
functional roles and operations at that particular level of inquiry. 
Moreover, by means of an example drawn from vision research, I 
suggest that intentional predicates can play important heuristic role in mechanis-
tic explanations as tools for functional decomposition, and work as a necessary 
theoretical scaffolding on the way to more precise mechanistic and 
computational explanations. This suggests a dynamic picture of mech-
anism description, in which looser terms are replaced by more precise 
ones as research progresses.  
Finally, in the last section of the paper, I show that often the gen-
eral suspicion against mechanistic explanation of intentional-level 
phenomena relies on mistaken presuppositions about the nature of 
constitutive explanation. Opponents of mechanistic explanation of the 
mind have often pointed out that personal-level phenomena have 
properties (e.g., normativity, rationality) that do not have counterparts 
at subpersonal levels, and argued that this makes intentional phenom-
ena irreducible to subpersonal goings-on (Hornsby 2000; McDowell 
1996). To answer this challenge, I emphasize the non-reductivist na-
ture of constitutive explanation. Mechanistic constitutive explanations 
do not amount to conceptual identifications between personal-level 
phenomena and subpersonal processes; explaining does not mean 
explaining away, but instead it provides answers to what-if questions 
regarding the relationships between the properties of the whole and 
the properties of the component parts. This kind of explananda-
questions do not exhaust the intentional phenomenon under study: in 
order to achieve comprehensive explanations of social and intention-
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al-level phenomena, reductive heuristics must be combined with non-
reductivist research methods. 
5.4. Explanatory power of extended cognition 
Whether human cognition is partly constituted by components resid-
ing outside the skull is the question at the heart of an extensive debate 
in the philosophy of psychology. In Explanatory power of extended cogni-
tion, I approach the topic of extended cognition as a question of scien-
tific concept formation. I regard this perspective as well motivated but 
underrepresented in the contemporary philosophical debates on ex-
tended cognition. The early philosophical discussions on distributed 
and extended cognition were largely inspired by interesting develop-
ments in the psychological sciences, and many of the examples were 
drawn from scientific research (Clark 1997; Hutchins 1995; Hutchins 
2010). However, as the philosophical debates on the topic have be-
come perhaps more conceptually sophisticated, the intimate connec-
tion to scientific research has often been lost.  
A common argumentative move in the debates has been to appeal 
to the explanatory power of the extended cognition hypothesis to 
assess its plausibility (Barker 2010; Clark 2007; Rupert 2004; Sprevak 
2010). However, both proponents and critics have based their argu-
ments on intuitive notions of explanatory power, and no systematic 
account of the notion has been offered in the debate. In this article, I 
try to fill this lacuna by applying CC-theory and the mechanistic theo-
ry of kinds to the problem of cognitive system demarcation.  
Relying on the contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation, I 
put forward my differential influence criterion for cognitive mechanism 
demarcation. In brief, I propose that a cognitive system ought to in-
clude only those variables, the variation in which explains contrasts in 
the cluster of explananda at hand. That is, while background condi-
tions typically make a causal difference to the target of explanation, 
the variation in them is such that it cannot distinguish between the 
explanandum state and its contrastive foil. By reviewing a set of ex-
Samuli Pöyhönen 
50 
!
amples from the literature, I show that my criterion leads to reasona-
ble judgments of cognitive system demarcation. It blocks cognitive 
bloat, but in principle allows for cognitive extension. That is, while 
differential influence does not regard the boundaries of the organismic 
skin-bag (Clark 2008, xxvii) as an obvious way to demarcate cognitive 
systems, it makes explicit why not all causal factors connected to a 
phenomenon should be treated as its genuine components.  
A crucial implication of the differential influence approach is that 
cognitive system demarcation becomes dependent on explananda. 
This, in turn, leads to cognitive systems pluralism: in light of different ex-
planatory aims, different scientific fields can end up with different 
demarcations of cognitive system boundaries. I suggest that given the 
complex nature of phenomena studied in the cognitive sciences, such 
classificatory pluralism is tenable, and that it can be understood as a 
consequence of the division of cognitive labor between research per-
spectives.  
The differential influence criterion implies that once a set of ex-
planandum-questions is held fixed, questions of explanatory relevance 
are settled and, consequently, so is the question of mechanism demar-
cation. In other words, given explananda, the differential influence 
criterion results in unambiguous judgments of cognitive extension. 
The principle in itself, however, offers no assistance in assessing the 
explanatory power of externalist explanatory strategies in comparison 
to intracranialist ones. Therefore, the differential influence criterion 
has to be supplemented with further analysis of the notion of explana-
tory power. By relying on Ylikoski and Kuorikoski's (2010) inferential-
ist account of explanatory power, I analyze an example case drawn 
from memory research. I argue that this approach to explanatory 
power that builds in the contrastive-counterfactual theory provides a 
powerful tool for constructing a view of the epistemic coordination 
between different research perspectives. It suggests that different 
classificatory strategies employed in laboratory research and in ecolog-
ical approaches to human memory are characterized by different pro-
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files of explanatory virtues and are thus fitting for answering different sets 
of explananda. In consequence, my approach draws a picture of cog-
nitive system demarcation as one of finding an optimal fit between the 
cluster of explananda relevant to a scientific field and the correspond-
ing explanatory mechanisms.  
Regarding extended cognition as an ontological thesis, my conclu-
sion in the paper is deflationary. Cognitive systems are cheap – sys-
tems and mechanisms can be demarcated in various ways, and looking 
for "the" correct cognitive kinds appears a misguided aim. However, 
comparing the explanatory power of different classification schemes 
suggests a way to move beyond inarticulate classificatory pluralism, 
and allows one to assess the characteristic epistemic strengths and 
weaknesses of extended and intracranialist approaches. 
5.5. Understanding non-modular functionality – Lessons 
from genetic algorithms 
The third pair of articles discusses challenges to the mechanistic mod-
el of scientific concepts. First of the two, Understanding non-modular 
functionality – Lessons from genetic algorithms concerns the limits of mecha-
nistic explanation in the cognitive sciences. The paper elaborates the 
observation that evolutionary design processes can create tangled and 
complex causal systems that are hard to explain and understand, and 
since the human cognitive system is a product of biological evolution, 
it might resist our successful applications of the mechanistic research 
heuristics. 
According to a common view, evolutionary designs are often 
opaque because they cannot accurately be analyzed by functional de-
compositions inspired by engineering-intuitions and rational recon-
struction (Clark 1997; Marcus 2008). The problem with these kinds of 
observations has usually been that while they are not especially con-
troversial, the exact nature of the problem has been hard to articulate, 
and it is still not clear how, precisely, evolutionary design creates bar-
riers for understanding or mechanistic explanation. In this paper, 
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Jaakko Kuorikoski and I try to shed light on this problem by introduc-
ing a simple genre of computational processes that mimics evolution-
ary design, genetic algorithms. We suggest that evolutionary design 
processes create at least two kinds of problems for mechanistic under-
standing and for the heuristics of functional decomposition and local-
ization. They lead to (1) psychologically foreign designs that often 
show (2) lack of both functional and structural modularity. Our main 
focus is on the second challenge, which has received less attention in 
the literature (Jacob 1977).  
Bechtel and Richardson (2010) observe that a precondition for the 
successful application of the heuristics of decomposition and localiza-
tion is that the target system is nearly decomposable (Simon 1962). 
We argue that a similar property of the architecture of complex sys-
tems, modularity, is needed for the functioning of these heuristics. The 
contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation can make the ra-
tionale behind this requirement clear: constitutive explanations allow 
inferences regarding how the whole would change, were its compo-
nents or their organization different. However, this requires that indi-
vidual components can be intervened on without disturbing the func-
tioning of other parts. In contrast, if it is not possible to produce a 
representation of the target system in terms of parts and variables that 
can be varied in a modular manner, changes to parts ramify uncontrol-
lably and the inferential usefulness of the mechanistic model is re-
duced.  
The issue of the modularity of the human cognitive architecture 
has played an important role in the history of the mind sciences 
(Fodor 1983; Uttal 2003; Zola-Morgan 1995). The question is of 
course an empirical one, and a definitive answer is still beyond the 
reach of our scientific knowledge. However, to get a firmer conceptual 
grip on the kind of problems that evolutionary design raises for mech-
anistic explanation, we mimicked some central structural features of 
evolutionary design processes in a computer simulation. We replicated 
a simple genetic algorithm (GA) simulation, where the GA was used 
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to develop a DNA for controlling the behavior of a simulated robot in 
a simple can-picking game. We then compared the solutions produced 
by the algorithm to ones written by a human designer (Mitchell 2011; 
cf. Goldberg 1989; Holland 1975; Mitchell 1998). 
The simulation confirmed our expectations about the nature of 
evolved designs, and the solutions created by the GA clearly illustrate 
the problems to understanding raised by non-modular design. Suc-
cessful solutions to the problem developed by the algorithm employ 
efficient behavioral strategies that cannot be deciphered simply by 
examining the isolated structural elements that determine the behavior 
of the simulated robot. Instead, looking holistically at the broad phe-
notypic behavior of the robot is necessary to detect the behavioral 
"hacks," which make the evolved solutions more efficient than the 
ones arising from engineering-minded design strategies. The problem 
with these highly efficient middle-level behavioral strategies is that 
while they are easy to visually detect in behavior, they are (1) holisti-
cally distributed across the DNA of the robot and have no dedicated 
structural basis. A change in a particular locus in the DNA often 
changes several behavioral strategies at once. Relatedly, the strategies 
are not functionally modular in the sense that they are not discrete but 
consist of collections of separate adaptations in different parts of the 
DNA. In consequence, these middle-level behavioral patterns are (2) 
not structurally localizable in any particular part of the DNA, but only 
trivially in the whole genome. Moreover, there are (3) strong interac-
tion effects between the fitness-effects of the strategies and very spe-
cific selection environments. Often a strategy is adaptively valuable 
only in environments that are very similar to the ones in which it 
evolved. What is common to all these challenges is that they make it 
hard to derive robust counterfactual generalizations regarding the 
relationship between particular components of the system and its 
overall behavior, and thus they reduce the usefulness of mechanistic 
research heuristics.  
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The example discussed in the article is of course highly artificial, 
and the important dissimilarities between the simulation and biological 
evolution suggest that the model should only be thought of as concep-
tual exploration regarding the nature of evolutionary design. However, 
it makes precise the ways in which non-modularity can hinder mecha-
nistic understanding, and helps to recognize the limits of the mecha-
nistic model of explaining phenomena in the social and behavioral 
sciences. 
5.6. Natural kinds and concept eliminativism 
The last article takes a broader view on the natural kinds model of scien-
tific concepts. In a slightly reflexive move, I examine the controversy 
surrounding the scientific concept of CONCEPT. Empirical research in 
psychology suggests that human conceptual abilities are sustained by 
several distinct cognitive mechanisms that do not act together in an 
orchestrated manner (see section 2.2.). That is, the cluster of proper-
ties typical of concepts is not sustained by one kind of mechanism, 
but rather by three different submechanisms: those corresponding to 
prototypes, exemplars, and theory-based concepts. According to 
Edouard Machery (2005; 2009; 2010a), the mechanistic theory of nat-
ural kinds suggests that the real natural kinds in this case are the ones 
corresponding to the submechanisms, and in order to avoid attribu-
tion errors, one should eliminate the notion of CONCEPT from scien-
tific usage. 
Although the empirical research underlying Machery's argument is 
relatively uncontroversial, his eliminativist conclusion has met a lot of 
resistance. The critics have argued that CONCEPT plays an indispensa-
ble role in psychological research. It captures a set of questions and 
generalizations having to do with the human capacity for conceptual 
thought in general. Abandoning the notion would therefore deempha-
size this set and hinder scientific progress because there would be no 
notion to integrate results from research on subkinds of concepts 
(Couchman et al. 2010; Edwards 2010; Hampton 2010). Moreover, 
Chasing phenomena 
55!
!
defenders of the notion of concept in psychology have argued that 
despite being analyzable into further subkinds, CONCEPT qualifies as a 
mechanistic natural kind (Samuels & Ferreira 2010). 
In my analysis, I draw two conclusions from this impasse. The 
view of conceptual change employed by Machery, the split-lump-
eliminate scheme, (1) is not sufficient for concept eliminativism, and 
more fundamentally, (2) the natural kinds model of scientific concepts 
that it draws on is ambiguous and conflates several epistemic roles that a 
concept can play. 
I argue that ultimately the different sides in the debate rely on dif-
ferent properties of natural kinds. According to my analysis, Machery 
emphasizes features of natural kind concepts that make them useful 
tools for referring to open explananda, whereas anti-eliminativists con-
tent themselves with a definition of natural kinds that allows them to 
function as mechanistically grounded explanantia. Both sides draw on 
the tradition of natural kinds: as has now been mentioned several 
times, the notion of kind has typically been used to separate inductive-
ly unexhausted concepts from stipulations, but an equally important 
epistemic role for natural kind terms has been to justify inductive 
inference regarding kind properties. I argue that these two epistemic 
roles are sustained by separate properties of kind terms, and that clear-
ly distinguishing between these sets of properties brings forth a dis-
tinction between two types of scientifically pertinent concepts that I 
call investigative kinds and instrument kinds. Furthermore, I propose that 
in addition to these types of concepts, also non-mechanistic framework 
kinds play an important role in scientific research. 
Treating a concept as an investigative kind means that in addition 
to justifying inductive inference, members of the kind are assumed to 
share yet unknown similarities, and thus we can learn more about 
them by empirically investigating the properties of their instances. For 
this reason, investigative kind concepts are good vehicles for repre-
senting targets of ongoing empirical research, and often stand for 
explananda in scientific theories.  
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On the other hand, instrument kinds can be internally heterogene-
ous in a way that often undermines their role as targets of further 
empirical study. There is no reason to assume that their members 
share properties apart from the ones governed by the homeostatic 
mechanism of the kind. In a sense, the unity of the kind is exhausted 
by knowing the finite cluster of kind-properties governed by the 
mechanism. Scientific concepts such as ENZYME, VITAMIN, and per-
haps CONCEPT are based on a clear causally specified role, but are 
known to be structurally heterogeneous (Bechtel 1984; Couch 2009; 
Richardson 2008). However, as explanantia and as storages of scien-
tific knowledge about phenomena, they are reliable: the abstractly 
defined causal mechanism of the kind supports a cluster of kind-
typical properties, and therefore it is justified to assume that correctly 
identified members of the kind share this property cluster. I argue that 
such functionally identified but causally supported concepts are com-
mon in science and often face no fear of elimination. 
Furthermore, I suggest that not all scientific concepts must be 
grounded in well-defined mechanisms. As pointed out already by the 
late logical empiricists, many prominent scientific kinds are cluster-
notions (Putnam 1975a, 379). They are not defined by their role in a 
single law or theory, but reside at the intersection of several theories, 
and have slightly different meanings in different research programs. I 
suggest that despite not being anchored in any specific causal mecha-
nisms, framework kinds like ENERGY, GENE, RATIONALITY or IN-
FORMATION often play an important epistemic role. As suggested by 
Susan Leigh Star in her work on boundary objects, in science we need 
concepts simultaneously inhabiting several social worlds. They must 
be malleable enough to adapt to the informational requirements of 
different disciplines, but still maintain the identity of the target across 
different sites (Star & Griesemer 1989). 
This distinction between different types of scientific concepts of-
fers a plausible solution to the impasse between Machery and anti-
eliminativists by suggesting that Machery's argument only amounts to 
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showing that CONCEPT is not an investigative kind. More generally, 
my approach draws attention to a hitherto overlooked form of con-
ceptual change in science, change in the inferential status of the concept. 
In addition to the operations described by the SLE scheme, conceptu-
al change consists also in often subtle changes in the inferential poten-
tial of concepts. The labels ‘investigative,’ ‘instrumental,’ and ‘frame-
work kind’ correspond to such inferential statuses, and keeping track 
of how scientific concepts move from one concept-type to another is 
one way of representing such conceptual change.  
6. Discussion  
In this concluding section, I sketch the outlook on conceptual change 
in science suggested by the results obtained in the articles. Therefore, 
instead of aiming for a general summary of the sundry results, I focus 
on three features of the mechanistic theory that I find central for con-
ceptual change: (1) the naturalness of mechanistic kinds forms a con-
tinuum; (2) natural kinds can be identified based on functional de-
scriptions and thus have multiply realized components; and, (3) the 
mechanistic theory is compatible with classificatory pluralism. I pro-
pose that – despite their counter-intuitiveness – these properties to-
gether make the mechanistic theory a promising platform for theoriz-
ing about conceptual change in the social and behavioral sciences. In 
section 6.4., I draw the threads together and outline the picture of 
interdisciplinary conceptual integration suggested by my approach. 
6.1. Kinds and mechanistic extrapolation 
A central aim of this dissertation has been to argue that the mechanis-
tic theory of natural kinds offers a plausible foundation for a natural-
istic theory of concepts in the social and behavioral sciences. It cap-
tures a common practice, in which category-based inferences are justi-
fied by referring to knowledge of the causal structures underlying the 
phenomenon in question. Also, compared to the traditional empiricist 
models of induction in philosophy, the mechanistic theory provides a 
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richer picture of inductive inference, because it can be elaborated by 
connecting it to recent advancements in the philosophical thinking on 
scientific explanation: Rather than putting questions of induction in 
terms of the nebulous notions like projectibility and genuine lawlike-
ness, the mechanistic theory makes it possible to frame such inference 
as mechanistic extrapolation based on knowledge of the sustaining causal 
structures and environmental conditions (Guala 2005; Steel 2008). 
However, while the mechanistic theory is intended to offer a 
common picture of concept formation across the special sciences, it 
need not lead to disregarding important dissimilarities between do-
mains. There clearly are differences between the properties of biologi-
cal and social mechanisms, and respectively, the natural kinds relying 
on such mechanisms also have different properties. Therefore, the 
mechanistic picture is no fixed procrustean bed that stretches con-
cepts used in the social and behavioral sciences to fit a rigid model of 
classification originating in the natural sciences. Instead, my approach 
suggests that naturalness of kinds comes in degrees. Classic examples of 
natural kinds are characterized by a cluster of properties sustained by a 
stable and robust mechanism. For example, the typical properties of 
noble metals (e.g., reflectivity, density, malleability) are constituted by 
the lattice structure of the atoms. The structure is not sensitive to 
disturbances, and produces the same observable properties under a 
wide range of background conditions. By contrast, mechanisms un-
derlying social phenomena are often fragile. For instance, the observ-
able features of a social group do not generally depend only on the 
intrinsic properties of the group members themselves, but instead 
they result from interactions with non-members, and are therefore 
sustained by context-sensitive and extrinsic mechanisms. Moreover, as 
the looping effect of human kinds suggests, the functioning of the 
mechanisms of such interactive kinds can sometimes be altered simply 
by revealing their existence (Mannheim 1952). That is, when people 
become aware of classifications pertaining to them, their behavior 
changes.  
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Consequently, inductive inference regarding human kinds is more 
complicated and sensitive to disturbances than in the more traditional 
cases. However, as suggested in [II], the epistemic advantages of 
mechanistic extrapolation apply also in these situations involving 
agency and interpretation: Despite the interaction effects characteristic 
of human kinds, it is desirable that explanation and prediction of phe-
nomena build on causal knowledge of the processes underlying such 
phenomena.  
6.2. Classificatory strategies for complexity 
An important aspect of a naturalistic theory of scientific concepts and 
conceptual change is that it should be compatible with what is known 
about the users of such representations. Therefore, the theory must 
somehow account for the gap between the limited cognitive capacities 
of those who use the representations and the often causally very com-
plex nature of the phenomena studied (Mitchell 2003). I suggest that 
two features of my mechanistic theory, (1) its compatibility with ab-
stract mechanisms and (2) classificatory pluralism, offer a response to 
this challenge.  
As is pointed out in [VI], viable scientific concepts often refer to 
mechanistically heterogeneous structures. Kinds like EYE, ENZYME, or 
CONCEPT are individuated by the functional properties that they have 
as parts of causal systems, and on more fine-grained levels of descrip-
tion, the instances of these kinds can differ from each other in many 
ways. Sometimes the existence of such multiply realized kinds has 
been used as an argument against the need for a mechanistic ground-
ing for special science kinds (Kincaid 1997; Weiskopf 2011). Howev-
er, I hold that the mechanistic theory of natural kinds can account for 
the sensible anti-reductionist intuition behind the multiple realizability 
arguments while still holding on to the idea that the ability of kind-
concepts to license inductive inferences is based on them being an-
chored in causal structures.  
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The crucial conceptual resource for this argumentative move is the 
non-fundamentalist understanding of mechanisms stemming from the 
contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation. It makes it possible 
to understand functionally individuated instrument kinds as relying on 
abstractly characterized causal mechanisms [VI]. Instrument kinds can 
be regarded as being multiply realized in the sense that while instru-
ment-kind concepts support invariant generalizations and interven-
tions regarding the properties governed by the homeostatic mecha-
nism, they remain agnostic about several implementation-level differ-
ences between the instances of the kind.  
Now, I suggest that the motivation for instrument-kind classifica-
tions is the management of the cognitive economy. As has been ar-
gued by several authors, scientific representations are inevitably par-
tial, and each representation can only capture some aspects of the 
complex targets of study (Cartwright 1999; Mitchell 2003, 183; Mäki 
1994; Mäki 2011; Wimsatt 2007). In the same spirit, I propose that 
instrument-kind concepts could be seen as a result of a classificatory 
strategy that Levins (1966) called sufficient parameters: higher-level classi-
fications are often created by intentionally leaving out parameter val-
ues not relevant for the epistemic project at hand. Instrument kinds 
thus result from the epistemic strategy of abstraction, and the kind of 
multiple realizability manifested by the resulting kinds does not create 
an ontological puzzle, unlike is often assumed in the literature on the 
topic (cf. Shapiro 2000).14  
 
Another perhaps counter-intuitive property of the mechanistic theory 
of natural kinds uncovered in the articles is the classificatory pluralism 
                                                      
14 This leaves open the possibility of there being other kinds of multiple 
realization, in which the kind-properties would result from widely 
heterogeneous underlying structures. However, as Bechtel and Mundale 
(1999) have suggested, such radical multiple realizability is probably more a 
philosopher's fiction than an empirically live possibility. 
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inherent in the theory. As argued in [IV], the mechanistic theory sug-
gests that different scientific fields sharing a target of study can often 
demarcate the mechanisms underlying the target in different ways, and 
consequently, end up with different ways of classifying the domain.15  
Instead of taking this as an argument against my position, I suggest 
that since pluralism is a fact of the matter in the sciences (Mitchell 
2003), it is an advantage of my theory of conceptual change that it can 
account for the fact. Often the targets studied in the social and behav-
ioral sciences are products of evolutionary design, and many of their 
properties are sustained by intricate causal interactions with the envi-
ronment. In consequence, it becomes less obvious where the bounda-
ries of such systems should be drawn, and such targets often refuse to 
be captured by a single classificatory scheme. I suggest that this com-
plexity of targets is often reflected in scientific research practices [IV]. 
For example, in memory research, the laboratory and ecological para-
digms delineate their systems of interest in different ways, and ap-
proach them with variables formulated at different levels of abstrac-
tion. This leads to the different approaches having what I call different 
profiles of explanatory power, i.e. they can answer different clusters of 
explanatory questions regarding the target phenomena.  
I propose that like multiply realized kinds, this natural kinds plural-
ism should not be seen as a ontological conundrum, but instead as an 
epistemic strategy for dealing with complexity. By employing parallel 
classification schemes that can meet different inferential and practical 
demands, scientific disciplines studying causally complex phenomena 
bring about a division of cognitive labor: In order to produce finite 
and understandable theories of their targets, different scientific fields 
                                                      
15 This pluralist tendency can be found also in Boyd's own theory of kinds 
(Boyd 1999) and in the recent formulations of his position, he has made this 
aspect of the theory more explicit than before (2010). Boyd's writings, 
however, offer little guidance for how to overcome the kind of relativism 
implied by indexing kind-terms to disciplinary matrices. 
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aim to capture different parts of the complex causal web sustaining 
the targets they study. By so doing, they can focus on those properties 
that are central to the epistemic aims of their particular discipline. 
6.3. Beyond the natural kinds model  
At this point, one could challenge my view by pointing out that I have 
watered down the idea of natural kind to the point where the resulting 
classifications are no longer natural in any meaningful sense. That is, 
because my theory does not clearly differentiate between universal and 
spatiotemporally restricted kinds, micro-level kinds and macro-kinds, 
naturally occurring and artificial kinds, or even between biological and 
social kinds, it seems to do away with most of the common contrasts 
intuitively associated with the naturalness of a kind. 
While this objection is reasonable, I do not see it primarily as a 
challenge to my account of scientific concepts, but instead as a general 
argument against the use of the notion of natural kind. As noted by 
Hacking (2006) and Griffiths (2004), the concept is a loaded one. 
Because of the multitude of distinct contrasts to naturalness of a kind, 
the use of the notion can often spark unnecessary proprietary debates 
about its correct meaning, and create more confusion than clarity. 
However, problems with the concept of natural kind do not under-
mine the usefulness of the mechanistic theory as an account of con-
ceptual change: None of the senses of naturalness mentioned in the 
paragraph above are necessary for guaranteeing the particular property 
of natural kinds that has motivated the epistemology-oriented tradi-
tion of kinds since Mill (2002) – the epistemic reliability of scientific 
concepts. As I argue on several occasions in the following articles, it is 
precisely the mechanistic grounding of natural kinds that separates 
them from arbitrary or conventional classifications that fail to support 
reliable inferential practices.  
One way to avoid unnecessary confusions would be to regiment 
the use of the notion of natural kind so that only categories with in-
trinsic essences and crisp perspective-independent boundaries would 
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be called natural ones. Such kinds can mostly be found in physics and 
chemistry, and usually they tend to fall on the intuitively correct side 
of the contrasts listed above (cf. Ellis 2001). However, this does not in 
any way reduce the need for a theory of the foundations of concept 
formation in the social and behavioral sciences. On the contrary, I 
suspect that when faced with such causally messy domains, our every-
day intuitions of where the phenomena are, and how the units of anal-
ysis should be chosen, tend to become increasingly unreliable [IV]. In 
such cases, having a systematic theory of classification and concept 
formation seems crucially important.   
Therefore, I regard it as an important virtue of the mechanistic 
theory that it can provide a realist account of classification even for 
causally complex target domains. While the kind-formation strategies 
of abstraction and pluralism described above suggest that the epistem-
ic aims of a discipline have a role in classificatory decisions, this makes 
mechanistic kinds conventional only in a weak sense. Despite the 
differences in the ways in which different disciplines describe their 
mechanistic variables and how they draw mechanism boundaries, the 
theory portrays the different classificatory perspectives as all latching 
on to the same objectively existing structures in the world. Ultimately, 
whether philosophers would call the resulting classifications natural 
kinds is not an issue of great importance to scientific practice. 
 
In the following concluding section of this introductory essay, I make 
some brief remarks on how the mechanistic theory could be seen to 
form the core of a framework for thinking about conceptual change 
and interfield integration. I suggest that making explicit the mechanis-
tic commitments of investigative kinds and instrument kinds as well as 
the non-mechanistic ones of framework kinds offers a way to see the 
different conceptualizations of targets in different scientific fields as 
setting inferential constraints on one another. Metaphorically, these 
constraints could be seen as the threads that weave the separate classi-
ficatory perspectives into parts of a more unified picture of the stud-
Samuli Pöyhönen 
64 
!
ied phenomena. The following discussion thus complements the 
aforementioned strategies of abstraction and pluralism with a third 
one required by interdisciplinary knowledge production, that of concep-
tual integration.  
6.4. Conclusion. Weaving the mechanistic fabric  
In 20th century philosophy, the most well-known way of thinking 
about integration between the sciences was epitomized by Oppenheim 
and Putnam's (1958) hierarchical view, according to which the unity of 
science was to be reached by expressing the vocabulary and the laws 
of the special sciences in the language of physics by means of a series 
of successive micro-reductions. However, since the 1960s, much of 
the discussion around the organization of the sciences has challenged 
this idea. Arguments based on multiple realizability, ontological disu-
nity of the sciences, and methodological discontinuities between scien-
tific disciplines have all aimed to show the insufficiency of the reduc-
tionist model (Fodor 1974; Dupré 1995; Cartwright 1999; Taylor 
1971; Geertz 1973).16 
In the first section of this introductory essay, I pointed out that ex-
amination of phenomena residing at interdisciplinary boundaries in 
the social and behavioral sciences suggests that neither the reduction-
ist-unity picture nor the views defending strong autonomy of the spe-
cial sciences can offer a satisfactory account of interdisciplinary epis-
temic collaboration. To return to an example discussed in section 1 
and many of the articles, consider again Asperger's syndrome. It 
seems highly implausible that, in the near future, the explanatory re-
sources of the "lowest-level" disciplines studying the human mind 
(i.e., cellular and molecular neuroscience) would be sufficient for a 
satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon – not to mention the 
design and implementation of effective interventions. In general, phe-
                                                      
16 For comprehensive discussions of the developments of the idea of the 
unity of science, see Cat (2010) and Bechtel & Hamilton (2007). 
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nomena in the social and behavioral sciences are often embedded in 
social and cultural structures in a way that strongly suggests that also 
higher-level factors must play a role in their explanation. 
On the other hand, also positions advocating strong disconnec-
tions between the different fields in the social and behavioral sciences 
appear untenable. Given a sensible materialist picture of the human 
mind and sociality, it should be quite uncontroversial that ultimately 
the world of meanings and interpretation is supported by the mind-
brain, and in consequence, more precise knowledge regarding the 
functioning of this system can be helpful also for explaining intention-
al and social behavior. Therefore, while the non-reductionist motiva-
tion underlying the disunity arguments is plausible, adherents of the 
non-reductionist views often go too far when they promise to insulate 
the conceptual systems of different disciplines from each other. 
All in all, the unity-disunity dichotomy does not seem like a fruitful 
framing for questions of epistemic integration between the sciences, 
and strong claims of disciplinary autonomy in the social and psycho-
logical sciences have often been motivated not so much by theoretical 
or ontological reasons than by sociological ones having to do with the 
disciplinary identities of the social sciences (Wallerstein 1996, ch. 1). 
My approach to interfield coordination builds on a more egalitarian 
view of the organization of the sciences first envisioned by Otto Neu-
rath (1937; 1946). Unlike the more well-known reductionist vision 
adopted by many of the other logical empiricists, Neurath conceived 
of the unity of science not as an ideal endpoint of inquiry, but as an 
ongoing process of iterative systematization of terminology, symbol-
ism, and theoretical tools between different scientific fields. Angela 
Potochnik (2011) suggests that the work of authors such as Darden 
and Maull (1977), Bechtel (1984), Mitchell (2003), and Craver (2007) 
can be seen as advancing this coordinate unity view of the organization 
of the sciences.  
For my purposes, especially Darden and Craver's work on inter-
field theories and multi-level mechanisms seems like a promising start-
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ing point for thinking about conceptual integration. Craver's (2007, ch. 
7) recent picture of the mosaic unity of the neurosciences represents 
probably the most developed version of this approach. Using the 
history of memory research in neuroscience as his case study, Craver 
proposes that by examining the relationships between mechanisms at 
several levels, it is possible to construct a multi-level mechanistic de-
scription of the target system. The gist of Craver's model is to under-
stand integration not as reduction or derivation, but as accumulation of 
mutual constraints between mechanism descriptions. Roughly, lower-
level accounts provide knowledge of the entities and activities occur-
ring in the higher-level mechanisms, and higher-level mechanisms are 
often necessary for identifying the roles of these entities in the more 
general picture of the functioning of the system. As the number of 
such mutual constraints between levels increases, it becomes possible 
to fill in the details in the initial mechanism sketch, and the research 
converges towards a more accurate description of the actual multi-
level mechanism sustaining the target phenomenon. 
I propose that this approach to bridging mechanism descriptions 
through the identification of constraints between research perspec-
tives is useful also for thinking about integration between distinct 
mechanism-based concepts. As suggested above in section 6.2., the 
mechanisms underlying parallel conceptualizations of shared targets 
often overlap and reside at different levels of abstraction. Therefore, 
the general task in conceptual integration is to work out the relation-
ships between the various mechanism descriptions corresponding to 
concepts, and, if needed, modify the classification schemes so that 
conflicts between mechanistic commitments are resolved.  
I think that both the bottom-up and top-down constraints sug-
gested by the mosaic unity picture, as well as interfield relationships 
introduced by Darden and Maull (1977), provide useful heuristics for 
weaving the parallel mechanisms into parts of a more coherent whole: 
(i) identities; (ii) part-whole relationships; (iii) cause-effect relation-
ships; and, (iv) function-structure relationships between mechanisms 
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or their components all suggest different ways in which mechanistic 
structures underlying the classificatory schemes of neighboring fields 
can be related. Ultimately the epistemic payoff from discovering such 
constraints is to make new information available for research in a 
scientific discipline, and thereby facilitate the creation of more accu-
rate conceptualizations of targets. More precisely, explicating the 
mechanistic commitments of concept use should lead to the identifi-
cation of at least two kinds of inferential relationships between concepts 
in neighboring domains, those of conflict and complementarity.  
First, explication of the mechanistic commitments of concept use 
can lead to perception of genuine conflicts between classification 
schemes, suggesting that at least one of them must be revised. For 
example, in the psychological research on concepts, mechanistic con-
flicts between the neo-empiricist approach and the more traditional 
prototype, exemplar, and theory-based theories seem likely. The dif-
ferent theories are phrased at approximately the same level of abstrac-
tion, and aim to explain roughly the same explananda. However, they 
make substantially different presuppositions concerning the processes 
and representations sustaining our capacity of conceptual thought. A 
promising strategy for resolving the conflict would be to look to fields 
like cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology for additional mech-
anistic information about the processes underlying the competing 
theories, and based on that information determine which theory must 
give way.17  
However, the non-fundamentalist approach to mechanisms intro-
duced in section 4.3. suggests that prima facie competing conceptualiza-
tions can also often turn out to be compatible, and often complemen-
tary. The epistemic strategies of abstraction and classificatory plural-
ism allow neighboring fields to end up with mutually enriching classi-
ficatory strategies, where the dissimilarities between the mechanisms 
                                                      
17 See, for example, Machery (2010b) for references to possibly relevant 
research on the neuroscience of concepts.  
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employed reflect the division of cognitive labor. As argued in [IV], 
different mechanism descriptions can be used to answer distinct con-
trastive explananda, and illuminate different aspects of the target. For 
example, such a solution has recently been proposed to perennial 
disputes regarding the causal efficacy of personal-level psychological 
states. As argued by proponents of the contrastive-counterfactual 
theory, neuroscientific and personal-level explanations of behavior 
typically capture different contrastive-counterfactual dependencies and 
therefore need not be incompatible with each other (Raatikainen 2010; 
Woodward 2008; Ylikoski 2001). 
 
In addition to these mechanism-based forms of conceptual integra-
tion, the approach to scientific concepts developed in this dissertation 
also goes beyond the mosaic unity model. I have claimed that causally-
based concepts do not exhaust the variety of concepts used in science. 
Instead, I proposed that at least three types of scientific concepts are 
employed in research: investigative kinds that refer to open explanan-
da with yet unexhausted inductive potential, instrument kinds that act 
as reliable explanantia, and framework-kind concepts, which are not 
anchored in any particular causal mechanism.  
As I argue in [VI], rather than invalidating the mechanistic theory, 
acknowledging the existence of these multiple ways of functioning of 
concepts merely places the theory within a more general picture of the 
conceptual change. Anchoring scientific concepts in well-specified 
causal structures roughly in the way suggested by the SLE scheme 
helps to make them inferentially reliable, and as suggested in the para-
graphs above, examining the interrelations between mechanistically 
grounded concepts provides a means for obtaining more encompass-
ing knowledge of the complex targets of study. However, thanks to 
their particular way of functioning, framework concepts appear to 
serve a complementary role, where they act as the communicative glue 
in the mosaic of interdisciplinary research, bringing together the dif-
ferent perspectives.  
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As a tentative suggestion, my approach thus recommends that in 
addition to tracing the mechanistic commitments of concept use, a 
theory of conceptual change in science should pay attention to the 
various epistemic roles that concepts can have in research. By keeping 
track of the different types of inferential commitments made by using 
concepts, it is possible to facilitate interfield communication, guard 
against error, and weave contributions from distinct fields into parts 
of a coherent and comprehensive picture of the target of research. 
While this picture of interfield integration is inevitably a mere sketch, 
and much remains to be done in future work on the topic, I believe 
that the approach developed in this dissertation strikes a plausible 
balance between the unity and disunity of science. My theory of con-
ceptual change does not envision the reduction of the patchwork of 
theories and concepts to a single representational framework, but 
instead it suggests that integrative efforts involve groping in the dark 
for reliable inferential connections between concepts employed in 
different fields. However, it does retain integration as a theoretical 
ideal for scientific research in a world that is at the same time disor-
dered, dappled, but one.  
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